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Malingering includes the intentional feigning of psychiatric symptoms combined with 
motivation for external gain (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Malingering is likely to 
occur in the justice system in both criminal and civil contexts, as there is increased opportunity 
for secondary gain in these settings. When individuals successfully malinger, it can be very 
costly for the United States. For example, if an individual successfully malingers, it can delay 
their criminal proceedings, allow them to inappropriately use resources associated with 
psychiatric or medical treatment, allow them to gain access to unneeded medications or financial 
assistance, or allow them to avoid work (Chafetz & Underhill, 2013; Walczyk, Sewell, & 
DiBenedetto, 2018). As a result, mental health experts are often asked to evaluate for 
malingering in criminal and civil psycholegal contexts. Psychological testing is a primary 
method used to assess for such feigned symptoms, as it standardizes the assessment process, 
increasing validity and reliability of subsequent findings (Aronoff et al., 2007; Rogers & Bender, 
2003). As a result, there is an abundance of literature examining the validity and reliability of 
feigning measures. The majority of feigning research utilizes simulation designs, in which a 
group of participants are instructed to simulate mental illness (Rogers & Gillard, 2011). 
Simulation studies have been published since the 1980s (Berry & Nelson, 2010), but the context 
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of feigning has changed since that time.  Most notably, individuals wishing to feign a particular 
disorder in recent years have easy access to a substantial amount of literature about relevant 
symptoms through a simple online search. This study added to the body of literature using 
mental health experts as simulators, thus considering whether those with greater knowledge of 
mental illness would be identified as feigning. This study was one of the first to also examine the 
impact of professional differences within an expert sample. Using an archival analysis, 271 
mental health experts instructed to simulate symptoms of schizophrenia on the Personality 
Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007) were compared to 81 psychiatric inpatients who 
completed a genuine PAI during their inpatient hospitalization and were diagnosed with 
schizophrenia at the time of their discharge. Several analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were 
conducted to examine differences between these two groups, as well as differences within the 
mental health experts by discipline and level of education. Results indicated that mental health 
experts were generally not successful at feigning psychiatric symptoms. Experts scored 
significantly higher on three of the PAI indicators of malingering when compared with the 
genuine psychiatric inpatients. Further, there were no significant differences when splitting the 
mental health experts group by discipline or level of education. Overall, the results suggest that 
academic knowledge related to mental illness might not increase one's ability to feign mental 
illness. Alternately, mental health experts may not necessarily serve as more “sophisticated” 
simulators in these research designs, despite their expertise in the mental health field. The 
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The construct of malingering is currently defined in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) as “the intentional production of false or 
grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such 
as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, evading criminal 
prosecution, or obtaining drugs” (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013, p. 726). 
Malingering poses a significant burden on the United States justice system, as it has several 
costly consequences in both criminal and civil contexts (Chafetz & Underhill, 2013; Walczyk, 
Sewell, & DiBenedetto, 2018). In general, if an individual successfully malingers psychological 
symptoms, it threatens the execution of justice. In criminal contexts, if an individual successfully 
malingers psychological symptoms and is deemed incompetent to stand trial, it can delay their 
criminal proceedings unnecessarily. If an individual successfully malingers psychological 
symptoms and evades criminal responsibility, they may be moved from a correctional facility to 
a psychiatric hospital, inappropriately utilizing limited and costly resources needed for patients 
with genuine psychological disorders (Walczyk et al., 2018). Individuals who are housed in 
correctional facilities may also attempt to malinger psychological or medical symptoms in order 
to be transferred to a medical center, where they can be provided with costly desired medications 
and allowed more freedoms (Walczyk et al., 2018). In civil contexts, individuals who 
successfully feign psychological or physical symptoms may be awarded greater financial 
compensation, avoid work, gain access to unneeded medications, or obtain limited financial 
resources, such as public assistance. For example, Chafetz and Underhill (2013) estimated that in 
2011, the cost of malingering for the United States Social Security Administration was over $20 
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billion for psychological disorder disability claimants. It is important to note that this figure only 
included malingered psychological disorders, not malingered physical illnesses (Chafetz & 
Underhill, 2013). Clearly, the costs of malingering place a serious burden on society, as well as 
the execution of justice in the United States. As such, it is essential that psychologists are 
adequately trained in the detection of malingering.           
The History of Malingering 
Empirical psychological literature regarding the construct of malingering was codified in 
1980, when it first appeared in the third version of the DSM (DSM-III; APA, 1980). Since its 
initial appearance in the DSM, there have been only minor changes in its definition and 
conceptualization. In the DSM-III, malingering was listed as a V code, which indicated that it 
was a condition, rather than a psychiatric diagnosis, not attributable to a mental disorder but was 
a focus of attention or treatment. In the DSM-III, malingering was defined as “the voluntary 
production and presentation of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms. 
The symptoms are produced in pursuit of a goal that is obviously recognizable with an 
understanding of the individual’s circumstances rather than of his or her individual psychology” 
(APA, 1980, p. 331). The DSM-III furthered the definition with examples of such goals 
including avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, evading 
criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs (APA, 1980). The conceptualization of malingering 
remained listed as a V code in the text revision of the DSM’s third edition (DSM-III-R; APA, 
1987). The definition of malingering remained quite similar, but the term external incentives 
became clearly associated with malingering in this DSM edition (APA, 1987). Malingering was 
defined as “intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological 
symptoms, motivated by external incentives…” (APA, 1987, p. 360). The external incentives 
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listed remained the same as the examples of external goals listed in the DSM-III, with the 
addition of securing better living conditions (APA, 1987). In the fourth edition of the DSM, the 
conceptualization of malingering remained similar (DSM-IV; APA, 1994). However, the DSM-
IV specified that malingering can sometimes represent adaptive behavior, such as “feigning 
illness while a captive of the enemy during wartime” (APA, 1994, p. 683).  
The definition and classification of malingering remained exactly the same in the text 
revision of the DSM’s fourth edition (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000) and the fifth edition (DSM-5; 
APA, 2013). Further, since the condition of malingering was added to the DSM-III in 1980, there 
was a note that the potential for malingering should be thoroughly assessed in certain specific 
circumstances. This note has remained consistent in each of the following editions of the DSM 
since 1980. In the most recent edition, the DSM-5 noted that malingering should be thoroughly 
assessed for if any combination of the following specific circumstances are present: 
(1) Medicolegal context of presentation (e.g., the individual is referred by an attorney to 
the clinician for examination, or the individual self-refers while litigation or criminal 
charges are pending); 
(2) Marked discrepancy between the individual’s claimed stress or disability and the 
objective findings and observations; 
(3) Lack of cooperation during the diagnostic evaluation and in complying with the 
prescribed treatment regimen; and  
(4) The presence of antisocial personality disorder. (APA, 2013, p. 727) 
In order to classify an individual as malingering, three components must be present, 
including the intent to feign, the actual feigning, and the impetus for external gain (Raine, 2009). 
The importance of an external incentive must be emphasized, as it differentiates malingering 
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from factitious, conversion, and somatic symptom-related disorders (APA, 2013). In the case of 
factitious disorders, there is an absence of obvious external gain, but rather, the individual may 
be feigning symptoms in relation to internal rewards or unrecognizable external rewards. And in 
the instance of both conversion and somatic symptom-related disorders, the individual is not 
aware that they are feigning certain symptoms, but rather, their apparent aim is to assume the 
sick role (APA, 2013). Therefore, there is no intent to feign specific symptoms.  
Despite the relatively unchanged definition of malingering since its first appearance in 
1980, empirical interest in the construct of malingering has increased exponentially since that 
time (Berry & Nelson, 2010). In the 1980s, there were approximately 1-2 relevant empirical 
publications per year that examined the construct of malingering. By the 2000s, there were 
approximately 56-101 publications per year that evaluated some aspect of malingering (Berry & 
Nelson, 2010). Berry & Nelson (2010) noted that in 2009, there were more than 90 publications 
on malingering. A brief search of the literature published in 2020 yielded 126 publications with 
the keyword “malingering,” demonstrating that empirical interest in the construct of malingering 
has continued to expand over the decades.  
Malingering in Forensic Contexts 
In the field of forensic psychology, which bridges the gap between psychology and the 
law, there is an increased opportunity for external gain. For example, individuals facing criminal 
proceedings may be presented with the external gain of reduced incarceration time if they can 
successfully evade criminal liability during their proceedings or use symptoms to mitigate 
sentencing. In addition, individuals who initiate a civil disability or personal injury claim may be 
presented with the external gain of increased monetary rewards if they can successfully report 
and present with psychiatric distress. Established rates of feigned psychiatric symptoms in both 
5 
 
civil and criminal contexts have corroborated the need for a thorough assessment of malingering 
in these settings. For example, the prevalence of malingering has been estimated to be around 13 
– 29% in civil contexts (Merckelbach, Smeets, & Jelicic, 2009), and to vary anywhere from 17 – 
56% in criminal contexts (McDermott, Dualan, & Scott, 2013; Merckelbach et al., 2009). 
Therefore, in these psycholegal contexts, it is particularly important for forensic mental health 
professionals to evaluate the validity of clients’ psychiatric presentations, as was stated in the 
DSM-5 (APA, 2013). 
Because of the high prevalence of feigned psychiatric presentations, as well as the clear 
external incentives in psycholegal settings, it is essential that forensic mental health professionals 
become competent in the evaluation of malingering. Although the DSM-5 criteria stipulate what 
factors may distinguish genuine and malingered presentations, there have been criticisms of the 
DSM-5’s approach. For example, using a sample of 24 individuals known to be malingering on 
an inpatient forensic unit, Rogers (1990) criticized the DSM-5’s methodology for the assessment 
of malingering, claiming that these criteria were able to detect only approximately 67% (n = 16) 
of individuals who were malingering. Additionally, when using the DSM’s malingering criteria 
in an examination of a comparison sample composed of 113 randomly selected psychiatric 
patient records, 55% (n = 62) of individuals were identified as meeting the criteria for 
malingering (Rogers, 1990). Therefore, for every one individual who was correctly identified as 
malingering, four individuals likely to be genuine were incorrectly identified as malingering 
(Rogers, 1990; 1997). Because of the high stakes involved in the assessment of malingering, as 
well as the stigma of labeling an individual as malingering (Robinson & Monsivais, 2011), 
diagnostic accuracy is of utmost importance.  
The Assessment of Malingering 
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The definition of malingering involves two components: the intentional feigning of 
psychiatric symptoms and motivation for external gain. Although the empirical examination of 
malingering has become more prevalent since the 1980s (Berry & Nelson, 2010), the conceptual 
differences between malingering and feigning are an important distinction to make when 
interpreting such research, as there are contexts in which the motivation for external gain is not 
overtly clear or obvious. Much of the extant research examining the evaluation of malingering 
are actually examining the detection of feigning. This is because much of the existing literature 
focuses on psychological measures utilized to detect feigning. Because these psychological 
measures do not examine for potential external gains, the conclusions drawn are about feigning 
rather than malingering. There is a lack of substantial literature examining motivations for 
feigning psychiatric symptoms in several psycholegal contexts, although it is evident that such 
motivations exist in psycholegal contexts.  
Therefore, while assessment instruments have been designed to assist with the detection 
of malingering, these tools are not sufficient alone (Franklin, 2008). Forensic psychologists 
should also conduct clinical interviews, which are especially important in exploring the 
individual’s potential motivations for feigning (Kocsis, 2011). It has been recommended that 
forensic psychologists review the individual’s case history, as well as obtain collateral 
information about the individual. Relevant collateral information includes contacting people who 
have had close interactions with the individual, as well as obtaining academic records, past 
mental health treatment records, medical records, and rap sheets (Conroy & Kwartner, 2006). 
The use of psychological instruments designed to detect feigning, in combination with collateral 




Empirical research has found that there are several indicators of potential malingering 
that can arise during a clinical interview (Conroy & Kwartner, 2006; Rogers, 1997; Rogers & 
Bender, 2003). For example, individuals who are attempting to feign psychiatric symptoms are 
more likely to report severe psychotic symptoms, such as frequent hallucinations and delusions. 
Individuals may report that they have a number of severe psychiatric symptoms that are not 
typically experienced together (Rogers, 1997). These individuals may reiterate the prevalence of 
these symptoms several times throughout the clinical interview in an attempt to remind the 
forensic mental health professional of their severity. However, individuals who are attempting to 
feign psychiatric symptoms may stop conveying such symptoms throughout the duration of the 
clinical interview because of fatigue (Conroy & Kwartner, 2006). In these instances, research has 
recommended that an attempt to feign psychiatric symptoms is considered (Conroy & Kwartner, 
2006; Rogers, 1997; Rogers & Bender, 2003).    
Even though the above indicators to examine during a clinical interview are empirically-
supported and can assist a forensic mental health professional’s clinical judgment in the 
assessment of malingering, this method alone is often not sufficient to accurately assess for 
malingering (Rogers & Shuman, 2000). Clinical judgment alone introduces the threat of 
individual biases from the psychological evaluators. For example, clinical judgment relies on 
intuition and is only one point of possibly idiosyncratic data. This method risks the possibility of 
misclassification of malingering (Rogers & Bender, 2003). As such, it has been recommended 
that no assessment of malingering rely solely on a clinical interview (Rogers & Shuman, 2000). 
Psychological testing may be used to aid with detection and diagnostic accuracy of malingering 
(Resnick, 1999; Resnick & Knoll, 2018; Rogers & Bender, 2003). Even with the limitation that 
psychological testing examines feigning and not malingering, the aid of psychological testing in 
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the assessment of symptom validity is essential because it standardizes the process in which 
psychologists assess for feigning and aims to increase validity and reliability of findings 
(Aronoff et al., 2007). It also introduces another point of data for psychologists to consider in 
their assessment of malingering (Rogers & Bender, 2003). There are several psychological 
instruments that are designed to detect feigned impairment. These measures, if standardized and 
validated appropriately, are often able to assist the forensic mental health professional in the 
evaluation of malingering. 
Broadly speaking, the assessment of feigning includes two different types of testing, 
which are cognitive effort testing and exaggerated psychiatric symptom testing. Tests of 
cognitive effort examine for specific feigned cognitive deficits, such as fabrication of intellectual 
or neuropsychological deficits (Conroy & Kwartner, 2006; Rogers & Bender, 2003). There is a 
wide array of measures designed to detect feigned cognitive impairment, and reviews of such 
measures are available elsewhere (Rogers & Bender, 2003). In addition to tests of cognitive 
effort, there are also psychological measures designed to assess the validity of reported 
psychiatric presentations. There are also multiple methods in which tests of feigned psychiatric 
symptoms can be administered to an individual. For example, scales that evaluate feigning may 
be embedded in broad psychological tests, such as multiscale measures of psychopathology, 
which include several validity scales within the measure (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2020a; 2020b; 
Morey, 2007). Tests of feigned psychiatric symptoms may also be standalone, which means their 
only goal is to assess the validity of the individual’s presentation. For example, there are 
structured interviews that aim to assess for bizarre psychological symptom presentations only 
(Rogers, Sewell, & Gillard, 2010). Utilizing a multimethod approach that includes both 
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embedded and standalone tests of feigned impairment will help to bolster the comprehensiveness 
of the feigning assessment. 
While it is not possible to review all measures developed to examine exaggerated 
psychiatric symptoms, some validated tests of exaggerated psychiatric symptoms (Rogers & 
Bender, 2003) include the Structured Inventory of Reported Symptoms – 2nd Edition (SIRS-2; 
Rogers et al., 2010), Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST; Miller, 2001), 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – 3rd Edition (MMPI-3; Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 
2020a; 2020b), and Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007). The SIRS-2 and M-
FAST are considered to be standalone measures of feigned psychiatric symptoms, while the 
MMPI-3 and PAI are multiscale measures of psychopathology that have embedded validity 
scales. Overall, tests examining exaggerated psychiatric symptoms were designed to assess the 
genuine nature of reported psychiatric symptoms. As such, the predominant goal of these tests is 
to ensure that individuals are endorsing genuine psychological symptom patterns, and not over- 
or under-reporting symptoms or reporting inconsistent symptoms. Therefore, cut scores are 
utilized to classify individuals as responding genuinely versus those with a likelihood of 
distorting psychological symptoms.  
Standalone feigning measures. The Structured Inventory of Reported Symptoms – 2nd 
Edition (SIRS-2; Rogers et al., 2010) is a 172-item structured interview that assesses for 
distortion of psychological symptoms (Rogers et al., 2010). The SIRS-2 contains eight primary 
scales that assess for a range of feigning strategies, including rare symptoms, implausible or 
absurd symptoms, unusual symptom combination, discrepancies in reported and observed 
symptoms, excessive severe symptoms, excessive blatant symptoms, excessive subtle symptoms, 
and a high number of overly selective symptoms (Rogers et al., 2010). The SIRS-2 then utilizes a 
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four-option decision model to determine if the individual is likely to be responding genuinely, 
responding in an indeterminate style, probably feigning, or definitely feigning (Rogers et al., 
2010).  
The Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST; Miller, 2001) is a 25-item 
screening interview that assesses likelihood of feigning psychiatric illnesses. The M-FAST seven 
scales that each assess for a unique feigning strategy, including Reported vs. Observed 
Symptoms, Extreme Symptomatology, Rare Combinations, Unusual Hallucinations, Unusual 
Symptom Course, Negative Image, and Suggestibility (Miller, 2001). Then, a total score is 
created to determine whether an individual may be potentially feigning psychiatric symptoms. 
Because the M-FAST is a screening questionnaire, a score above the listed cutoff indicates that 
further evaluation of malingering is needed (Miller, 2001).  
Embedded feigning measures. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – 3rd 
Edition (MMPI-3; Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2020a; 2020b) is a 335-item forced-choice (true, 
false) self-report measure of general psychopathology. Embedded in the MMPI-3 are several 
validity indicators that assess response consistency, defensiveness, and endorsement of 
infrequent response patterns (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2020a; 2020b). The Cannot Say (CNS) 
scale examines non-responsiveness to the MMPI-3 content, the Variable Response Inconsistency 
(VRIN) scale measures consistency of responding, and the True Response Inconsistency (TRIN) 
scale measures a tendency to over-endorse items in one direction (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 
2020a; 2020b). The Combined Response Inconsistency (CRIN) scale, which is a new addition to 
the MMPI-3, combines the inconsistent response composites from both the VRIN and TRIN 
scales into a mixed inconsistent responding scale (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2020a; 2020b). 
Several MMPI-3 scales estimate the accuracy of reported psychiatric symptoms, including the 
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Infrequent Responses (F) scale, Infrequent Psychopathology Responses (Fp) scale, Infrequent 
Somatic Responses (Fs) scale, Symptom Validity (FBS) scale, Response Bias (RBS) scale, 
Uncommon Virtues (L) scale, and Adjustment Validity (K) scale. These scales examine the 
individual’s attempt to over-report symptoms, under-report symptoms, or respond to the test in a 
defensive manner (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2020a; 2020b). There are also several indexes that 
have been developed to further assess response styles on the MMPI. The Obvious-Subtle index 
(O-S) is a measure of exaggerated psychological distress characterized by more frequent 
endorsement of obvious rather than subtle items of distress (Wiener, 1948). Finally, the F – K 
index is a measure of dissimulation that attempts to identify minimized psychological distress 
(Gough, 1950).  
The Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007) is a 344-item forced-choice 
(false, slightly true, mostly true, very true) self-report measure of psychopathology. Embedded in 
the PAI are four validity indicators that assess for impression management, response consistency, 
and infrequent responding (Morey, 2007). The Inconsistency (INC) scale examines consistency 
of response style throughout the administration of the PAI. The Infrequency (INF) scale 
examines endorsement of infrequent or atypical symptoms. Finally, the Negative Impression 
Management (NIM) scale assesses for a tendency to over-endorse and present a negative 
presentation of the individual’s psychiatric symptoms, while the Positive Impression 
Management (PIM) scale reflects a tendency to under-endorse and present a positive presentation 
of the self as favorable and free from faults (Morey, 2007).  
Beyond the PAI’s four validity scales, there are also several indexes that have been 
developed to further assess symptom validity on the PAI. The Malingering Index (MAL) and 
Defensiveness Index (DEF) were developed by Morey shortly after the first version of the PAI 
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was released (Morey, 1993; 1996). MAL is an index composed of eight profile features which 
have been shown to occur much more frequently in profiles in which respondents feigned a 
specific mental disorder. DEF is an index consisting of features that have been shown to be more 
present in the profiles of individuals attempting to minimize psychiatric problems (Morey, 1993; 
1996). The Cashel Discriminant Function (CDF) is another measure of defensiveness that has 
been found to discriminate better than the PIM validity scale alone (Cashel, Rogers, Sewell, & 
Martin-Cannici, 1995). Finally, the Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF) is a combination of 
PAI scales that was created because it best differentiated feigning groups from a genuine clinical 
patients group taken from the normative database of the PAI (Rogers, Sewell, Morey, & Ustad, 
1996). These scales and indexes are used to detect feigned psychological presentations on the 
PAI.  
Validity in the Assessment of Feigning 
Because commonly developed measures assess the validity of symptoms rather than the 
incentive for invalid symptoms, the majority of research in this domain consists of findings about 
feigning rather than malingering. There are four major methods utilized in conducting research 
on feigning, including known-groups comparisons, bootstrapping, differential prevalence, and 
simulation designs (Rogers & Gillard, 2011). In known-groups comparisons, individuals who 
have been externally identified as feigning are compared to individuals with genuine 
psychological disorders, resulting in high external validity. These designs typically rely on 
mental health experts that independently identify individuals as feigning. If these mental health 
experts accurately identify feigning individuals as such, then the design also has high internal 
validity (Rogers & Gillard, 2011). However, the design’s internal validity will weaken if the 
identification of those who are feigning is inaccurate due to lack of expertise, relying on 
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inaccurate detection strategies, or using a classification method that is too broad (Rogers & 
Gillard, 2011). Bootstrapping involves the use of multiple feigning measures to classify 
individuals as likely-feigning and likely-honest, and these groups are then compared to one 
another. In differential prevalence designs, comparisons are made between individuals from 
settings that are assumed to have distinct prevalence rates of malingering, such as forensic and 
clinical settings. This method assumes that individuals in forensic settings, with external 
incentives to feign, will feign at a higher prevalence than individuals in clinical settings, without 
external incentives to feign. However, this method is considered to lack experimental rigor 
because there is no external criterion available to verify the exact percentages of genuine versus 
feigning participants in either group (Rogers & Gillard, 2011).  
The most common method utilized to research malingering is the simulation design 
(Rogers & Gillard, 2011). Simulation designs involve the comparison of responses from genuine 
individuals to individuals instructed to feign on specific psychological measures (Rogers & 
Gillard, 2011). Simulation designs yield the strongest internal validity, but sometimes at the 
expense of external validity (Rogers & Gillard, 2011). In simulation designs, genuine responses 
can consist of those without clinical symptoms who are instructed to respond honestly (“honest 
respondents”), or individuals with true mental illnesses (“clinical comparison group;” Hawes & 
Boccaccini, 2009). The use of a clinical comparison group strengthens the design’s external 
validity, and it is therefore strongly recommended when utilizing this method (Rogers, 1997). 
Feigned responses consist of research participants who are instructed to simulate a mental illness 
(Rogers & Bender, 2003). These feigned responses are compared to genuine individuals to 
determine the psychological measure’s classification accuracy (Rogers & Gillard, 2011).  
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In simulation designs, research participants are instructed to simulate, or feign, mental 
illness. The research participants may be coached or trained prior to participation, and they may 
be incentivized to increase motivation. These variables are sometimes introduced because it is 
believed that they increase the external validity of the design by creating more real-world 
circumstances (Rogers & Gillard, 2011). Research participants may also be instructed to simulate 
a specific mental illness or to simulate mental illness more broadly (Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009). 
While it may increase motivation to do well when provided with more specific instructions, such 
as simulating a specific mental illness, this method still fails to address why simulating 
successfully is important in this research design, regardless of type of mental illness (Rogers & 
Gillard, 2011). As such, researchers have questioned the ecological validity of simulation 
designs for decades (e.g., Haines & Norris, 1995). One main concern with simulation designs is 
whether those who are simulating in a research study respond similarly to those who are feigning 
in a real world context. An additional concern includes the potential differences between the 
coaching or training that research participants receive compared to the knowledge that inmates 
may learn from their peers about how to successfully simulate symptoms of mental illness while 
in an incarcerated setting.  
Due to the concern regarding the presentation of simulated responses in a research design 
versus a real-world context, the type of population examined is an important consideration in 
these designs. The utilization of samples of convenience in simulation designs, particularly when 
lacking a clinical comparison sample, has exacerbated concerns relating to the external validity 
of these studies (Brennan & Gouvier, 2006). These concerns can relate to both the knowledge of 
diagnostic criteria, as well as the motivation to feign. The knowledge that individuals have about 
the symptoms of mental illness can vary substantially. Existing research in this domain has 
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utilized a wide range of individuals, including those with mental illnesses, undergraduate 
students, and mental health experts as part of their simulation designs. While individuals with 
mental illnesses and mental health experts may both have more knowledge about mental 
illnesses, mental health experts may better understand how to simulate more effectively, as these 
experts are charged with the identification of feigning.  
 Examining feigning among individuals with mental illnesses. Several research studies 
have examined samples of individuals with genuine mental illnesses who were asked to simulate 
more severe psychiatric symptoms or different symptoms than those genuinely experienced. One 
of the first studies using this design examined a sample of 42 chronic outpatients who were most 
commonly diagnosed with schizophrenia, mood disorders, borderline personality disorder, and/or 
substance use disorders (Rogers, Sewell, & Ustad, 1995). These outpatient participants 
completed the MMPI-2 on two occasions. They were instructed to first respond honestly, and 
then to simulate “severe psychiatric problems” (Rogers et al., 1995). When responding honestly, 
the majority of participants had elevated scores on the Infrequency (F) and Back Page 
Infrequency (Fb) validity scales, indicating they were at a high risk of being mislabeled as 
feigners. Specifically, 88.1% of participants had elevated scores on the Infrequency (F) scale (F 
> 29), and 95.2% of participants had elevated scores on the Back Page Infrequency (Fb) scale 
(Fb > 25; Rogers et al., 1995). When simulating, 92.9% of participants had elevated scores on 
the Infrequency (F) scale again. In general, the participants were able to present severe 
psychological distress at a similar rate, and they were therefore not detected well by the 
Infrequency (F) scale when responding genuinely versus simulating severe psychiatric problems. 
Rogers and colleagues (1995) concluded that clinicians should interpret validity scales carefully 
when examining individuals with chronic mental illnesses and suggested that multiple validity 
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indices may be needed to detect feigned psychological presentations in this population. Berry et 
al. (2001) conducted a similar study with 132 outpatient psychotherapy participants who were 
randomly assigned to respond honestly, exaggerate their genuine symptoms, feign a specific 
disorder, or feign general psychological distress on the MMPI-2. The results indicated that the 
validity scale scores were significantly higher for all three simulation groups when compared to 
the honest respondents. However, there were no significant differences in validity scale scores 
between the three simulation groups (Berry et al., 2001).  
  Other researchers have utilized similar designs with samples of psychiatric inpatients 
instructed to simulate psychiatric symptoms. In 1998, Arbisi and Ben-Porath examined a sample 
of 74 psychiatric inpatients from a Veteran Affairs Medical Center. The participants completed 
the MMPI-2 after being randomly assigned to respond honestly or to simulate exaggerated 
psychiatric distress with a greater severity than their genuine psychiatric symptoms. Their results 
were compared to their previously completed MMPI-2 upon their admission to the Veteran 
Affairs Medical Center (Arbisi & Ben-Porath, 1998). Similar to Rogers et al.’s (1995) findings, 
the Infrequency (F) scale did not distinguish between the two groups. However, the 
Psychopathology Infrequency (Fp) scale was able to detect the simulated group from the honest 
group, suggesting that the Fp scale outperforms the F scale when examining individuals with 
mental illnesses (Arbisi & Ben-Porath, 1998). Finally, in 2007, Baity, Siefert, Chambers, and 
Blais investigated the validity indicators on the PAI also using a sample of 62 psychiatric 
inpatients. All of the participants completed the PAI honestly first, and then were randomly 
assigned to respond honestly, exaggerate their psychological symptoms, or minimize their 
psychological symptoms when completing the PAI for a second time (Baity et al., 2007). The 
results were all in the expected directions, with no differences in the honest group, lower scores 
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in the minimizing group, and higher scores in the exaggerating group. Baity and colleagues 
(2007) concluded that the NIM scale and RDF index were able to detect participants in the 
exaggerating group, and the PIM scale was able to detect participants in the minimizing group, 
providing promising evidence for the PAI’s validity indicators. However, simulation designs 
utilizing psychiatric patients as simulators face an inherent limitation when interpreting their 
findings, in which it is difficult to ensure that psychiatric patients actually followed instructions 
and simulated psychiatric symptoms. In a non-symptomatic sample, the elevation of psychiatric 
scales might be used to infer whether participants made a genuine attempt to feign symptoms. In 
samples with psychiatric symptoms, clinical elevations would be expected regardless of any 
attempt to feign or exaggerate symptoms. Some researchers address this limitation with the 
inclusion of a post-test questionnaire, asking participants to summarize their instructions and 
describe their attempt to feign at the conclusion of the study (e.g., Weiss & Rosenfeld, 2017).  
Additionally, individuals with genuine mental illnesses who are instructed to simulate 
may technically be exaggerating their genuine symptoms rather than feigning distinct symptoms. 
Yet, this exaggeration of existing genuine mental illness may be more realistic than using non-
clinical populations that are instructed to feign. One final major disadvantage of utilizing 
individuals with mental illnesses in simulation designs is the difficulty in accessing this 
population, often resulting in small sample sizes.   
 Examining feigning among undergraduate students. Although some research has been 
conducted using individuals with genuine mental illnesses who are instructed to simulate 
psychological distress, the majority of simulation designs utilize undergraduate students, 
typically recruited from undergraduate psychology courses, as simulators. One of the first studies 
examining undergraduate participants as simulators utilized the MMPI-2, and participants were 
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able to choose whether they wanted to exaggerate or minimize their psychological distress 
(Nicholson et al., 1997). Participants were instructed to fake in a believable manner, but they 
were not coached or trained in further detail. The results found that the F scale, Fp scale, and F – 
K index detected participants in the exaggerated symptoms group. The S scale was able to detect 
differences among participants in the minimized symptoms group, but the differences were small 
when compared to honest respondents (Nicholson et al., 1997). Bagby and colleagues (1997b) 
conducted a similar study, but undergraduate participants were instructed to respond honestly or 
minimize their psychological distress only. These researchers also found that the S scale was 
able to distinguish honest respondents from those minimizing psychological distress (Bagby et 
al., 1997b).  
 In order to increase motivation and effort when instructing undergraduate participants to 
feign psychological distress, researchers have also randomly assigned undergraduate participants 
to be coached in successful feigning or remain uncoached. This practice is warranted in research 
settings, as a survey of attorneys and law students revealed that approximately 50% of attorneys 
and 33% of law students believed that clients referred for psychological testing should be 
educated about validity scales and how to evade detection on response distortion measures 
(Wetter & Corrigan, 1995). Therefore, in 2002, Bagby, Nicholson, Bacchiochi, Ryder, and Bury 
conducted a study in which undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to be coached or 
uncoached about the validity scales on the MMPI-2 and PAI. All participants were then 
instructed to exaggerate psychological distress on both measures, and their results were 
compared to a sample of genuine psychiatric patients who completed both measures honestly. 
The results indicated that coaching participants did not have a significant effect on their ability to 
feign psychological distress. On the MMPI-2, the Fp, F, and Fb scales distinguished between 
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simulators and genuine patients. On the PAI, the RDF index was the only indicator that was able 
to significantly distinguish between simulators and genuine patients. These researchers 
concluded that when comparing the validity indicators on the MMPI-2 and PAI, the RDF index 
on the PAI was marginally superior to the MMPI-2’s validity indicators (Bagby et al., 2002). 
Blanchard, McGrath, Pogge, and Khadivi (2003) conducted a similar study with undergraduate 
participants who were randomly assigned to exaggerate psychological distress in either a forensic 
or psychiatric scenario. All undergraduate participants were coached about the validity scales 
and provided diagnostic information about symptoms of psychosis (forensic scenario) or major 
depression (psychiatric scenario). The results yielded that while the F – K index and Fp scale 
were able to detect simulators from honest respondents on the MMPI-2, the PAI scales 
demonstrated incremental validity over the MMPI-2 in all analyses (Blanchard et al., 2003). Both 
of these studies provided promising evidence for the validity indicators on the PAI. 
 In addition to varying whether undergraduate participants are coached on validity 
indicators, research in this population has also examined if undergraduate students could feign 
more successfully when instructed to feign a specific mental illness. Several researchers have 
focused specifically on instructing undergraduates to simulate post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD). When undergraduate participants were instructed to feign PTSD and compared with 
combat-related war veterans (Elhai, Gold, Frueh, & Gold, 2000) and survivors of child sexual 
abuse (Elhai, Gold, Sellers, & Dorfman, 2001) on the MMPI-2, several validity indicators on the 
measure were able to distinguish feigners from those with genuine PTSD. In both research 
studies, the O-S and F – K indexes were significant predictors of feigning (Elhai et al., 2000; 
Elhai et al., 2001). Similar to previous research conducted on the impact of coaching 
undergraduate participants, when participants were coached specifically regarding symptoms of 
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PTSD and warned about validity indicators, they were more likely to successfully feign PTSD on 
a brief measure of post-traumatic stress when compared with those who were uncoached (Elhai 
et al., 2007). However, when using the PAI and comparing coached and uncoached 
undergraduate participants to patients with genuine symptoms of post-traumatic stress, the results 
were not as distinct (Bowen & Bryant, 2006). These researchers found that both undergraduate 
participants who were coached on symptoms of post-traumatic stress and uncoached were easily 
detected on the PAI when compared with patients diagnosed with acute stress disorder. In 
particular, the NIM scale and MAL index distinguished coached and uncoached participants 
from genuine respondents (Bowen & Bryant, 2006). Guriel-Tennant and Fremouw (2006) 
conducted a similar study with coached and uncoached undergraduate participants instructed to 
feign symptoms of PTSD, but they also accounted for participants’ trauma history. Similar to 
Bowen and Bryant (2006), these researchers found that participants who were coached and 
participants who had a positive trauma history were no more successful at feigning than those 
who were uncoached or did not have a history of trauma (Guriel-Tennant & Fremouw, 2006). 
Taken together, all of these findings suggest that when undergraduate participants are instructed 
to specifically feign symptoms of PTSD, they are still able to be detected on several different 
psychological measures of feigning. These results generally held true even when participants 
were coached about symptoms of PTSD and validity indicators on the measures.  
 In addition to instructions to specifically feign PTSD, other researchers have examined 
specific instructions for other mental illnesses. In 2006, Jelicic, Hessels, and Merckelbach 
utilized a sample of 60 undergraduate participants that were instructed to respond honestly or 
feign psychosis. Among those who were instructed to feign psychosis, they were randomly 
assigned to receive no additional information, some information about symptoms of psychosis, 
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or some information about symptoms of psychosis plus a warning about the validity indicators 
(Jelicic et al., 2006). A screening feigning measure was able to distinguish honest responders 
from the three feigning groups, but there were no significant differences between the three 
feigning groups. These results suggest that even with coaching about symptoms of psychosis and 
warnings about validity indicators, psychosis simulators were still detected by psychological 
testing (Jelicic et al., 2006). Finally, Veltri and Williams (2013) furthered the body of research 
examining specific disorders by manipulating the specific mental illness that undergraduate 
participants were instructed to feign. Their sample of 265 undergraduates were randomly 
assigned to feign schizophrenia, PTSD, or generalized anxiety disorder, and they were randomly 
assigned to be coached about the validity indicators and symptoms of the disorder or remain 
uncoached (Veltri & Williams, 2013). The results indicated that the type of disorder being 
feigned moderated the impact of coaching on successful feigning. Specifically, validity 
indicators were higher for those who feigned schizophrenia when compared with those who 
feigned PTSD or generalized anxiety disorder. In other words, coaching for PTSD and 
generalized anxiety disorder significantly increased the probability of successful feigning, but 
coaching did not impact those in the feigned schizophrenia group (Veltri & Williams, 2013). 
Overall, these findings indicate that several factors can impact undergraduate participants’ ability 
to successfully simulate mental illnesses, including coaching about validity indicators on 
psychological measures, providing instructions about feigning a specific disorder rather than 
general feigning, and training participants about symptoms of the mental illnesses. But still, 
across these studies, simulating undergraduate participants were typically distinguished from 
honest respondents on the psychological measures of feigning.  
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While it is often more difficult to access individuals with genuine mental illnesses as 
simulating participants, these designs utilizing undergraduate students as simulators typically 
include larger samples due to the ease of accessing this population. But while undergraduate 
students in psychology courses may have some basic knowledge about mental illnesses, they 
may not understand why it is important to put forth effort in successfully simulating or how to 
relate to the scenarios provided in the research study. For example, undergraduate students may 
relate more directly to a scenario in which their simulated mental illness caused them to miss an 
exam compared to a scenario in which their simulated mental illness caused them to commit a 
violent felony (Rogers & Gillard, 2011). In order to address this limitation, some researchers 
began to use mental health experts as simulating participants.  
 Examining feigning among mental health experts. Although the majority of simulation 
research has been conducted with undergraduate student samples, who are typically recruited 
from psychology classes, these samples are still relatively naïve regarding knowledge of 
psychopathology. However, with the modern ease of internet searching, individuals wishing to 
feign particular psychiatric symptoms, or a mental illness, in recent years are now able to access 
a substantial amount of relevant information through a simple online search. Further, as it 
became more standard to include instructions to warn or coach participants about validity scales 
in simulation research, some researchers became concerned with psychological test security. In 
other words, coaching participants may undermine test security by inadvertently teaching 
individuals how to successfully feign mental illnesses beyond the scope of their research 
participation (Bagby et al., 1997a). This is especially true with an undergraduate student 
population, who may not continue to practice psychology beyond earning their undergraduate 
degree. In order to overcome these limitations in simulation research, some researchers began to 
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use individuals earning a higher education in the mental health field or directly working in the 
mental health field as simulation participants. Further, mental health experts may have the most 
intrinsic motivation to simulate well in this type of research study, as they likely learned the 
importance of accurately detecting malingering during their training.   
 In 1993, Rogers, Ornduff, and Sewell conducted the first study using graduate 
psychology students as “sophisticated” simulators. In this study, undergraduate “naïve” 
simulators and graduate “sophisticated” simulators were instructed to feign schizophrenia, 
depression, or generalized anxiety disorder when completing the PAI. Sophisticated simulators 
were given one week to prepare their feigned presentation, and naïve simulators were given 
minimal preparation time (Rogers et al., 1993). The results indicated that the NIM scale was able 
to detect those feigning schizophrenia, somewhat detect those feigning depression, and it was not 
able to detect those feigning generalized anxiety disorder. Interestingly, level of sophistication 
did not significantly impact ability to feign (Rogers et al., 1993). Rogers, Sewell, Morey, and 
Ustad (1996) conducted a follow-up study using a larger sample of doctoral psychology students 
as sophisticated simulators. Instead of comparing naïve and sophisticated simulator participants 
to honest respondents, they were compared to patients with genuine schizophrenia, depression, 
or generalized anxiety disorder (Rogers et al., 1996). In this study, sophisticated simulators were 
able to focus on their specific feigned disorder, whereas naïve simulators presented feigned 
symptoms across many of the PAI’s clinical scales. Therefore, the validity scales had moderate 
predictive power among the naïve simulators, but only modest predictive power among the 
sophisticated simulators (Rogers et al., 1996).  
 In a similar study conducted by Marion, Sellbom, and Bagby (2011), advanced clinical 
psychology graduate students were utilized as sophisticated simulators. The naïve and 
24 
 
sophisticated simulators were asked to feign major depressive disorder, schizophrenia, or PTSD, 
and their results were compared with patients diagnosed with the respective genuine disorders. 
The results indicated that although the sophisticated simulators were less likely to be detected 
when compared with the naïve simulators, both groups were detected by the psychological 
feigning measure when compared with the genuine patients (Marion et al., 2011). These studies 
provided overall evidence that although some advanced education in the psychological field may 
increase chances of successful feigning, psychological measures were still generally able to 
detect the feigners as such.  
 In 2001, Viglione and colleagues furthered this body of research by examining a sample 
of clinical psychology graduate students who were randomly assigned to feign depression or 
respond honestly on the MMPI-2. However, these researchers reintroduced the variable of 
providing caution to avoid detection on the psychological measure, and the graduate students 
were also randomly assigned to receive caution or no caution. The results indicated that when the 
sophisticated graduate student simulators were provided with caution to avoid detection, the 
MMPI-2 validity scales were not able to distinguish the feigners from honest respondents 
(Viglione et al., 2001). This study provides evidence that sophistication in the psychological field 
combined with coaching prior to psychological testing may lead to successful feigning. Building 
upon this finding, general intelligence may also impact the ability to successfully feign (Pelfrey, 
2004). Using a sample of graduate psychology students who completed a psychological measure 
of intelligence and then were asked to feign mental illness to avoid criminal responsibility for an 
alleged homicide, a higher level of intelligence was significantly related to evading detection of 
feigned symptoms on the MMPI-2 (Pelfrey, 2004). Therefore, it may not be a level of 
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sophistication specifically related to psychological knowledge, but rather a higher level of 
general intelligence that contributes to successful feigning. 
 With the consideration that general intelligence or sophistication in the psychological 
field may improve the ability to feign mental illness, several researchers began examining 
feigned schizophrenia specifically, as previous research has suggested that feigning symptoms of 
schizophrenia may be more challenging than feigning symptoms of anxiety or depression 
(Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009; Rogers et al., 1993). For example, Bagby and colleagues (1997a) 
utilized two sophisticated simulator groups, which consisted of 26 psychiatric residents and 
fellows and 28 psychology graduate students, and one naïve simulator group of undergraduate 
students. All simulators were instructed to feign schizophrenia and completed the MMPI-2. 
Bagby and colleagues (1997a) predicted that the psychology graduate students would perform 
better on this task when compared with the psychiatric residents because of their knowledge 
about psychopathology and psychological testing. When compared with patients with genuine 
schizophrenia, all three simulator groups were distinguished from the honest respondents. 
However, the two sophisticated simulator groups generally had lower scores on the validity 
scales when compared with the naïve simulators (Bagby et al., 1997a). There were no significant 
differences between the psychology graduate students and psychiatric residents, although the 
psychology graduate students had lower scores as a group on the validity scales. The researchers 
explained that there was a range of different experiences within the psychology graduate student 
group, which could have impacted these findings. They recommended using psychology experts 
or MMPI-2 experts in future research (Bagby et al., 1997a).  
In a similar study, Jelicic, van Gaal, and Peters (2013) utilized a sample of 23 mental 
health experts, which consisted of clinicians working in a psychiatric hospital (n = 9) and clinical 
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researchers working in a university (n = 14). The researchers noted that all mental health experts 
had at least a master’s degree and either clinical experience or research experience with 
psychosis (Jelicic et al., 2013). The mental health experts, along with a group of 24 naïve 
students, were provided with a screening measure of feigning via mail. They were asked to first 
respond honestly, and then to complete the measure a second time while feigning symptoms of 
psychosis to avoid criminal responsibility for a serious offense (Jelicic et al., 2013). Similar to 
previous findings, both groups of simulators were detected as feigners on the screening measure, 
but the mental health experts had lower scores on the validity scales when compared with the 
naïve students (Jelicic et al., 2013). However, a major limitation of this design is that all 
participants completed these measures independently after receiving them in the mail, which 
violates standardized test administration. Further, due to the small sample size, these researchers 
were unable to examine differences within the mental health experts group, including differences 
by level of education, or differences by experience in the clinical versus research domains.  
Finally, Poggioli (2001) conducted a similar study using therapy aids working in an 
inpatient psychiatric hospital as sophisticated simulators of schizophrenia. In this study, the naïve 
simulators were community participants. Both groups were randomly assigned to be coached or 
uncoached about the validity scales on the MMPI-2 as well (Poggioli, 2001). The results 
indicated that all four groups were detected as feigners when compared with patients with 
genuine schizophrenia. Similar to previous findings, the therapy aids who received coaching had 
the lowest scores on the validity scales (Poggioli, 2001). However, Poggioli (2001) noted that 
while the therapy aids represented a group of individuals with expertise in working with patients 
with schizophrenia, they were also a sample of convenience and were recruited from only one 
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hospital. It is also possible that therapy aids do not have any formal education in the mental 
health field, but rather they are only exposed to job-specific training at the psychiatric hospital.  
Taken together, the findings from Bagby and colleagues (1997a), Jelicic and colleagues 
(2013), and Poggioli (2001) suggest that educational or clinical expertise in the mental health 
field may somewhat improve the ability to feign symptoms of schizophrenia, but not to a 
significant level that evades detection on psychological testing. Bagby et al. (1997a) was able to 
compare psychological experts with psychiatric experts, but did not find any significant 
differences, possibly because the psychological experts were graduate students with varying 
levels of experience. These results demonstrate that experience is not an absolute or 
unidimensional construct. Further, those with expertise in psychiatry versus psychology undergo 
distinct training and receive different clinical opportunities. For example, as Bagby et al. (1997a) 
noted, psychological experts receive much more extensive training on psychological testing 
when compared to psychiatric experts. These differences in the construct of experience 
demonstrate its multidimensional and continuous nature. In addition, the type of experience that 
is relevant to a particular feigning scenario could have also impacted these findings. For 
example, a psychotherapist with experience in cognitive behavioral therapy for anxiety-related 
disorders may not necessarily have an improved ability to feign symptoms of schizophrenia due 
to their experience in treating symptoms of anxiety. Jelicic et al. (2013) was not able to compare 
differences within their mental health experts group due to their small sample size. And Poggioli 
(2001) utilized a group of therapy aids with clinical exposure to patients with schizophrenia, but 
this study did not describe the aids’ formal educational background in relation to the mental 
health field. Therefore, while it is possible that mental health experts may be able to feign 
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symptoms of schizophrenia or psychosis more successfully than naïve individuals, further 
research is needed to examine differences within the population of mental health experts. 
The current study addressed the existing gap in the literature by utilizing a large sample 
of mental health experts with varying expertise and levels of education who were instructed to 
simulate paranoid schizophrenia on the PAI (Morey, 2007). This study is particularly timely in 
consideration of modern advances with technology and the wealth of information available on 
the internet. For example, in recent years, individuals wishing to feign particular psychiatric 
symptoms, or a mental illness, are now able to access a substantial amount of relevant 
information through a simple online search. This may increase their chances of feigning such 
symptoms successfully. Therefore, simulation research utilizing individuals directly working in 
the mental health field as simulation participants may display the degree to which true clinical 
knowledge of symptoms, rather than knowledge learned only academically, could help an 
individual feign successfully. Further, the use of mental health experts may serve as a more 
suitable proxy for individuals who attempt to feign psychiatric symptoms in real world contexts. 
For example, although their source of motivation is different from these individuals, who have 
easy access to relevant knowledge using the internet and are motivated by the possibility of 
external gains, mental health experts also have easy access to relevant knowledge through their 
training and experience, and they may be motivated to learn about feigning and simulate 
successfully due to their own professional goals.  
Existing research has found that the PAI has several validity indicators that are sensitive 
to both coached and uncoached feigning. For uncoached feigning, the effect sizes are even larger 
when identifying feigning of severe mental illnesses rather than anxiety or mood disorders, and 
when comparing feigners to clinical patients rather than honest respondents (Hawes & 
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Boccaccini, 2009). The current study built upon this literature by instructing a large sample of 
mental health experts to feign paranoid schizophrenia, which is a severe mental illness, on a 
widely used psychological measure. The results of the feigning group were then compared to 
patients diagnosed with genuine paranoid schizophrenia. This study was the first to examine the 
differences in symptom validity between simulating mental health experts and genuine 
psychiatric patients using the PAI, which features three strong validity indicators, including the 
NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index (Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009). Finally, this study was 
one of the first to examine several differences between mental health experts based on their 
clinical discipline and level of education, addressing this gap in the literature.  
Hypotheses 
 Based on a review of the extant literature, the current study had seven main hypotheses: 
1. It was expected that, using their expertise in the field, the mental health experts group 
would be able to successfully feign paranoid schizophrenia on the PAI (Morey, 2007), such that 
they would not have overall elevated scores on the PAI Negative Impression Management (NIM) 
scale, Malingering (MAL) index, or Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF) index, but they would 
have at least one elevated score on one of the eleven PAI clinical scales.  
2. It was expected that the genuine psychiatric patients group would not be identified as 
feigning psychiatric symptoms on the PAI, such that they would not have overall elevated scores 
on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index.  
3. Because the mental health experts were expected to successfully feign paranoid 
schizophrenia on the PAI, it was expected that the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index 




4. It was expected that there would be no significant differences on the PAI NIM scale, 
MAL index, or RDF index between the mental health experts group and genuine psychiatric 
patients group, signifying that the expertise within the mental health experts group impacted their 
ability to successfully feign paranoid schizophrenia.  
5. It was expected that when the MAL index cutoff score, RDF index cutoff score, and 
NIM scale cutoff score were used together, this would improve classification accuracy above the 
NIM scale cutoff score alone.  
6. Within the mental health experts group, it was expected that those with doctoral 
degrees or beyond would be significantly less likely to be detected as feigning on the PAI, such 
that they would have significantly lower PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index scores, 
when compared with those with less than doctoral degrees in the mental health field.  
7. Within the mental health experts group, it was expected that those in the psychiatric 
field would be significantly more likely to be detected as feigning on the PAI, such that they 
would have significantly higher scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index, when 






The sample for the current study represents a subset of a larger database that was 
collected at Bellevue Hospital Center through New York University School of Medicine. All 
staff that collected data and participants included in the current study were from Bellevue 
Hospital Center. The sample included two groups: psychiatric inpatients and mental health 
experts. In order to be included in the psychiatric inpatients group, participants had to have at 
least one psychiatric admission to Bellevue Hospital Center, be age 18 or older at the time of 
admission, receive either a diagnosis or rule-out diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia at the time 
of discharge, and have completed the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007) 
during their psychiatric hospitalization. Of note, although the subcategories schizophrenia are no 
longer in the current DSM-5 (APA, 2013), due to the time period in which the data were 
collected, these subcategories of schizophrenia were used clinically at the time of data collection. 
And specifically, the diagnosis at the time of discharge was utilized in the inclusion criteria 
because it was the diagnostic-related variable with the most complete data information. In order 
to be included in the mental health experts group, participants had to be employed in either the 
psychological or psychiatric field, have completed the PAI during an educational didactic 
activity at Bellevue Hospital Center with instructions to simulate paranoid schizophrenia, and be 
age 18 or older at the time of the educational didactic activity. Further details about the inclusion 
and exclusion criteria are described in the Research Design and Procedure section below.  
After consideration of the inclusion criteria, the current study sample included a group of 
81 psychiatric inpatients, which represented 6.8% of the larger database of 1,198 psychiatric 
inpatients who had a total of 1,244 psychiatric hospitalizations. Of the 1,244 psychiatric 
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hospitalizations across the 1,198 inpatients, 27 individuals had completed the PAI more than 
once. In 24 cases, individuals completed the PAI on two occasions. Of those 24 cases, the first 
PAI administration was always included in the study, unless it had more missing variables than 
the second administration. In 3 cases, individuals completed the PAI on three occasions. Of those 
three cases, the first PAI administration was always included in the study, unless it had more 
missing variables than the subsequent administrations. Of the 1,198 psychiatric inpatients, 331 
individuals were diagnosed with or had a rule-out diagnosis of “schizophrenia and other 
psychotic disorder” at the time of discharge. Of those 331 psychiatric inpatients, 146 individuals 
were diagnosed with or had a rule-out diagnosis of schizophrenia at the time of discharge. Of 
those 146 psychiatric patients with schizophrenia, 81 individuals were diagnosed with or had a 
rule-out diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia at the time of discharge. These 81 psychiatric 
inpatients with a diagnosis or rule-out diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia at the time of 
discharge comprised the final sample of psychiatric inpatients. 
The group of 81 psychiatric inpatients were admitted to the hospital under civil (34.6%; n 
= 28) and forensic (64.2%; n = 52) statuses (datum for n = 1 was missing). Psychiatric inpatients 
admitted under civil statuses included individuals deemed to be a risk of harm to self and/or 
others. Psychiatric inpatients admitted under forensic statuses included individuals referred for 
competency to stand trial and/or criminal responsibility evaluations in the context of their 
criminal proceedings.  
 The psychiatric inpatients predominantly identified as male (90.1%, n = 73), while 8.6% 
identified as female (n = 7). The gender identity datum for one participant was missing (1.2%; n 
= 1). The average age was approximately 34 years old (M = 33.80, SD = 10.83, range = 18.17 to 
63.52). The majority of the psychiatric inpatients identified as African American (56.8%, n = 
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46), while 19.8% identified as Caucasian (n = 16), 14.8% identified as Hispanic (n = 12), 2.5% 
identified as Asian (n = 2), and 6.1% identified as multiracial or other (n = 5). Approximately 
75.3% (n = 61) of the psychiatric inpatients were diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia at the 
time of discharge, while 24.7% (n = 20) were given a rule-out diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia at the time of discharge.  
After consideration of the inclusion criteria, the current study sample included a group of 
277 mental health experts across 280 PAI administrations. Mental health experts were included if 
they earned an education in the psychological or psychiatric field, they participated in an 
educational didactic activity on psychological testing led by the Primary Investigator of the 
original research study between January 12, 1998 and October 27, 2009, they were at least 18 
years of age at the time of the didactic activity, and they completed the PAI (Morey, 2007) 
during the educational didactic activity with instructions to simulate paranoid schizophrenia. Of 
the 280 PAI administrations, three of the mental health experts had completed two different 
administrations of the PAI. In all three cases, the first PAI administration was always included in 
the study, resulting in a sample of 277 mental health experts.  
The mental health experts predominantly identified as female (66.8%, n = 185), while 
31.4% identified as male (n = 87). The gender identity data for five participants were missing 
(1.8%; n = 5). Available data indicated that the majority of the mental health experts identified as 
White (27.8%, n = 77), while 0.4% identified as African American (n = 1), 1.1% identified as 
Hispanic (n = 3), 3.6% identified as Asian (n = 10), and 0.4% identified as multiracial (n = 1). 
However, racial data for approximately 66.8% of the mental health experts were missing (n = 
185). Age data were unavailable for this group.  
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Approximately 28.9% of the mental health experts had expertise in psychiatry (n = 80), 
while 69.0% had expertise in psychology (n = 191). Professional data for six participants were 
missing (2.2%; n = 6). Of the psychiatric experts, 61.3% identified as medical students (n = 49), 
16.3% identified as psychiatrists (n = 13), 10.0% identified as residents (n = 8), and 12.5% 
identified as fellows (n = 10). Of the psychological experts, 2.6% identified as psychologists (n = 
5), 34.6% identified as doctoral-level interns (n = 66), 36.1% identified as doctoral-level externs 
(n = 69), 4.2% identified as doctoral students (n = 8), and 22.5% identified as master’s students 
(n = 43). 
Measures and Variables 
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI). The PAI (Morey, 2007) is a 344-item self-
report measure of psychopathology. Individuals respond to items using a four-point Likert scale. 
The PAI takes approximately 50-60 minutes to administer, and the measure has been validated 
for individuals ranging from 18 to 89 years old. This measure consists of four validity scales, 
eleven clinical scales, five treatment scales, and two interpersonal scales, as well as additional 
indexes created to address particular assessment concerns. The four validity scales include the 
Negative Impression Management (NIM) scale, Positive Impression Management (PIM) scale, 
Inconsistency (INC) scale, and Infrequency (INF) scale (Morey, 2007). The NIM scale measures 
the extent to which respondents describe themselves in an overly negative fashion, while PIM 
measures the extent to which respondents present themselves in an overly positive and favorable 
manner. The INC scale examines consistency of response style throughout the administration of 
the PAI, and INF examines endorsement of infrequent or atypical symptoms (Morey, 2007).  
Additional indexes that were created to further assess symptom validity on the PAI 
include the Malingering Index (MAL), Defensiveness Index (DEF), Cashel Discriminant 
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Function (CDF), and Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF). MAL is composed of eight profile 
features which have been shown to occur much more frequently in profiles in which respondents 
feigned a specific mental disorder, while DEF consists of features that have been shown to be 
more present in the profiles of individuals attempting to minimize psychiatric problems (Morey, 
1993; 1996). CDF further examines defensiveness and has been found to discriminate better than 
PIM alone (Cashel et al., 1995). Finally, RDF consists of a combination of 20 PAI full scale, 
validity, and subscale scores that differentiates simulated mental illness groups from genuine 
clinical patients (Rogers et al., 1996). RDF is calculated by multiplying these 20 PAI T-scores by 
their discriminant function weights and summing (Rogers et al., 1996). Taken together, these 
scales and indexes are used to detect feigned psychological symptoms on the PAI. 
Level of education in mental health. Participants in the mental health experts group 
were asked to identify their level of education in their respective mental health field while 
completing the PAI simulation activity. These participants were then dichotomized into mental 
health experts with a doctoral degree or beyond and experts with less than a doctoral degree. 
Those placed in the “with a doctoral degree or beyond” group included psychologists, 
psychiatrists, residents, and fellows. Those placed in the “less than a doctoral degree” group 
included medical students, doctoral-level interns, doctoral-level externs, doctoral students, 
master’s students, and staff who provide monitoring services for the psychiatric inpatients.  
Type of education in mental health. Participants in the mental health experts group 
were asked to identify the type of education they received in the mental health field while 
completing the PAI simulation activity. These participants were then dichotomized into those 
with psychiatric expertise and those with psychological expertise. Those placed in the 
“psychiatric expertise” group included psychiatrists, residents, fellows, and medical students. 
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Those placed in the “psychological expertise” group included psychologists, doctoral-level 
interns, doctoral-level externs, doctoral students, and master’s students. Staff who provide 
monitoring services for the psychiatric inpatients were excluded from this dichotomy, as their 
type of education and field of expertise was unknown.    
Research Design and Procedure 
 The current study represents an archival analysis of a portion of data collected as part of a 
larger study conducted at Bellevue Hospital Center through New York University School of 
Medicine from January 12, 1998 until October 27, 2009. The original data set consists of 
samples of civil and forensic psychiatric inpatients and mental health experts. All data from the 
original research study were collected by a Senior Psychologist at Bellevue Hospital Center, who 
served as Primary Investigator of the original research study. The sample of psychiatric 
inpatients consisted of archival data collection of all civil and forensic psychiatric inpatient 
records to examine all psychological testing results conducted for clinical purposes only. No 
psychological testing was administered solely for research purposes. The mental health experts 
group data were collected as part of an educational didactic activity led by the Primary 
Investigator of the original research study. All participants in the mental health experts group 
participated in an educational didactic activity about the utility of psychological testing. At the 
conclusion of the didactic activity, all participants were presented with a Personality Assessment 
Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007) and instructed to simulate responses on the PAI consistent with a 
paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis. The purpose of this activity was to demonstrate how 
challenging it is to feign a severe mental illness on psychological testing, even with expertise in 
the mental health field. Participants received general feedback on the group’s performance in the 
following educational didactic session, but they did not receive their individual results. The 
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original research study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at New York University 
School of Medicine/Bellevue Hospital Center.  
For the current study, a fully de-identified data set that could not be linked to the identity 
of any human subjects was provided to the Primary Investigator of the current study by the 
Primary Investigator of the original research study. For the current study, psychiatric inpatients 
were included if they had at least one psychiatric admission to Bellevue Hospital Center between 
January 12, 1998 and October 27, 2009, they were at least 18 years of age at the time of the 
psychiatric admission, they completed the PAI (Morey, 2007) for clinical purposes at any point 
during their psychiatric hospitalization, and they received a discharge diagnosis or rule-out 
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Of note, psychiatric inpatients were only included if they 
received a discharge diagnosis or rule-out diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia because the group 
of mental health experts were specifically instructed to simulate paranoid schizophrenia during 
their PAI administrations. PAI scores were reviewed for all participants across both groups. The 
validity of PAI profiles was determined using Morey’s (2007) recommended cut-scores for the 
four validity scales, which include INC ≥ 73, INF ≥ 75, NIM ≥ 92, and PIM ≥ 68. The current 
study received exempt approval by the Institutional Review Board at the City University of New 
York/John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and the original research study was approved by the 
Institutional Review Board at New York University School of Medicine/Bellevue Hospital 
Center.  
Statistical Analyses 
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS Statistics Version 26. Statistical 
significance were set at p < .05. Cohen’s d effect sizes were interpreted as small (d = 0.2), 
medium (d = 0.5), and large (d = 0.8) when appropriate, and area under the curve (AUC) values 
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were interpreted as high classification accuracy (AUC ≥ 0.8), moderate classification accuracy 
(AUC = 0.7), and low classification accuracy (AUC < 0.7) when appropriate. First, all data were 
screened for accuracy of data entry, missing information, and violations of all assumptions. 
Then, descriptive statistics were calculated for the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index 
in each group. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations were examined for these 
variables in each group. Next, the three malingering indicators (NIM, MAL, and RDF) were 
dummy coded to indicate if they were above or below the recommended cut-scores (NIM ≥ 92, 
MAL ≥ 111, and RDF ≥ 59). A frequency of malingering variable was then created to indicate 
how many of these scales (0, 1, 2, or 3) were elevated for participants within each group. This 
procedure was repeated separately for the genuine patients and mental health experts groups. 
Hypothesis #1 postulated that, using their expertise in the field, the mental health experts 
group would be able to successfully feign paranoid schizophrenia on the PAI, such that they 
would not have overall elevated scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index, but 
they would have at least one elevated score on one of the eleven PAI clinical scales. Of note, the 
current study did not restrict the clinical scales to only the paranoia and/or schizophrenia 
subscales because of the range of symptoms associated with schizophrenia. For example, a 
simulator making a genuine attempt to mimic symptoms associated with schizophrenia could 
have focused on negative symptoms and have been elevated on a scale other than paranoia or 
schizophrenia. Therefore, in order to be inclusive of what responses might indicate a genuine 
attempt to feign schizophrenia, all eleven PAI clinical scales were considered. To examine this 
hypothesis, means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations were calculated among the 
mental health experts for scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index. These mean 
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scores were then compared to the recommended cutoff scores (NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 111; RDF ≥ 
59). Elevations on the eleven PAI clinical scales were also examined.   
Hypothesis #2 expected that the genuine psychiatric patients group would not be 
identified as feigning psychiatric symptoms on the PAI, such that they would not have overall 
elevated scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index. To examine this hypothesis, 
means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations were calculated among the psychiatric 
patients for scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index. These mean scores were 
then compared to the recommended cutoff scores (NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 111; RDF ≥ 59).   
Hypothesis #3 anticipated that, because the mental health experts were expected to feign 
successfully, the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index would not demonstrate significant 
predictive power or high classification accuracy between groups. To examine this hypothesis, the 
NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index scores were dummy coded according to the 
recommended cutoff scores (NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 111; RDF ≥ 59). Using these three dummy 
coded variables and the frequency of malingering variable created above, several chi-square tests 
of independence were calculated to determine if that malingering indicator successfully 
differentiated between groups. When the assumptions of the chi-square test of independence 
were violated, Fisher’s Exact Test was utilized instead. Then, Receiver Operating Characteristic 
(ROC) curve analyses were conducted for the NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index to 
determine if they reached high levels of classification accuracy, indicated by area under the 
curve (AUC) values of at least 0.8 or higher. As such, AUC values were reported and interpreted 
for each malingering indicator.  
Hypothesis #4 postulated that there would be no significant differences on the PAI NIM 
scale, MAL index, or RDF index between the mental health experts group and genuine 
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psychiatric patients group. To examine this hypothesis, a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was performed. This one-way ANOVA utilized group (genuine patients versus 
mental health experts) as the between-subjects factor, and NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF 
index T-scores were used as the outcome measures. The groups were examined for violations of 
normality and variance. The F statistic, statistical significance, and effect size was reported. If 
statistical significance was found, post-hoc analyses were conducted. Then, the mean difference 
between groups, statistical significance, and effect size were reported for each post-hoc analysis.  
Hypothesis #5 expected that when the MAL index cutoff score, RDF index cutoff score, 
and NIM scale cutoff score were used together, this would improve classification accuracy above 
the NIM scale cutoff score alone. To examine this hypothesis, two binary hierarchical logistic 
regressions were conducted across both groups to determine the utility of the RDF index and 
MAL index beyond the classification accuracy of the NIM scale. In the first binary hierarchical 
logistic regression, the cutoff scores for each variable were utilized as the independent variables 
(NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 111; RDF ≥ 59). In the second binary hierarchical logistic regression, each 
malingering variable was entered using its continuous T-score. The type of group (psychiatric 
inpatients or “genuine responders” vs. mental health experts or “feigners”) was entered as the 
dependent variable in both models. Also in both models, the NIM scale variable was entered into 
the model as a first step, and then the MAL index and RDF index were entered as a second step 
in the model. For each binary hierarchical logistic regression, the overall model fit, Nagelkerke’s 
R2, chi-square, and odds ratios were presented. 
Hypothesis #6 examined differences only within the mental health experts group. It was 
expected that, within the mental health experts group, those with doctoral degrees or beyond 
would have significantly lower PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index scores, when 
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compared with those with less than doctoral degrees in the mental health field. To examine this 
hypothesis, another one-way ANOVA was performed. For this hypothesis, the mental health 
experts group was divided into experts with a doctoral degree or beyond and experts with less 
than a doctoral degree. The subsequent one-way ANOVA used these groups as the between-
subjects factor, and NIM, MAL, and RDF T-scores comprised the outcome measures. The 
groups were examined for violations of normality and variance. The F statistic, statistical 
significance, and effect size was reported. If statistical significance was found, post-hoc analyses 
were conducted. Then, the mean difference between groups, statistical significance, and effect 
size were reported for each post-hoc analysis.  
Finally, Hypothesis #7 also investigated differences only within the mental health experts 
group. It was anticipated that, within the mental health experts group, those in the psychiatric 
field would have significantly higher scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index, 
when compared with those in the psychological field. To examine this hypothesis, another one-
way ANOVA was performed. For this hypothesis, the mental health experts group was divided 
into those in the psychiatric field and those in the psychological field. The subsequent one-way 
ANOVA utilized these groups as the between-subjects factor, and NIM, MAL, and RDF T-
scores were entered as the outcome measures. The groups were examined for violations of 
normality and variance. The F statistic, statistical significance, and effect size was reported. If 
statistical significance was found, post-hoc analyses were conducted. Then, the mean difference 







Prior to all analyses, data were screened for accuracy of data entry, missing values, and 
violations of the assumptions of analyses. Screening identified multiple univariate outliers for 
several of the study measures, including the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 
2007) and selected PAI malingering indicators used for this study (Negative Impression 
Management [NIM] scale; Malingering [MAL] index; and Rogers Discriminant Function [RDF] 
index). Further, the NIM scale and RDF index produced skewness and kurtosis scores above 
2.58, which violates the assumption of normality (Field, 2001). The presence of outliers and 
violation of normality is expected, as these measures assess feigning and response style. 
Feigning and response style are constructs that should not be expected to demonstrate normal 
distributions. Further, several of the analyses conducted in this study did not require that data 
exclude outliers. Specifically, Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve analyses and chi-
square tests of independence used non-transformed values. Spearman’s rho was used in place of 
Pearson’s correlations. Finally, logistic regression analyses were used in lieu of discriminant 
function analyses, as logistic regression analyses are more resilient against violations of normal 
distributions (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2010). 
After the data were screened, descriptive statistics for the PAI negative impression 
management (NIM) scale, Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF) index, and Malingering (MAL) 
index were calculated for each group (see Table 1). Next, these three malingering indicators 
(NIM, RDF, and MAL) were dummy coded to indicate if they were above or below the 
recommended cut-scores (NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 111; RDF ≥ 59). A frequency of malingering 
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variable was then created to indicate how many of these scales (0, 1, 2, or 3) were elevated for 
participants within each group. Overall, the majority of the genuine psychiatric inpatients group 
was classified as feigning on either zero (n = 35; 43.2%) or one (n = 35; 43.2%) measure, while 
five participants (6.2%) were identified as feigning on two measures, and one participant (1.2%) 
was identified as feigning on all three measures. On the other hand, the majority of the mental 
health experts group was classified as feigning on one measure (n = 207; 74.7%), while 50 
participants (18.1%) were identified as feigning on two measures, and ten participants (3.6%) 
were identified as feigning on all three measures. A total of nine participants (3.2%) in the 
mental health experts group were identified as responding honestly on all of the measures. Table 
2 provides a summary of the participants in each group that were identified as feigning.  
The PAI clinical scales were then examined for each group. Of note, the average number 
of significant elevations (T ≥ 70) on the eleven PAI clinical scales across the psychiatric 
inpatients group was 2.8 clinically significant elevations (M = 2.78, SD = 3.12, range = 0 to 11). 
Meanwhile, the average number of significant elevations (T ≥ 70) on the eleven PAI clinical 
scales across the mental health experts group was 4.8 clinically significant elevations (M = 4.79, 
SD = 2.89, range = 0 to 11). Interestingly, out of the 81 psychiatric inpatients diagnosed with 
genuine paranoid schizophrenia, only 48.1% (n = 39) scored in the clinically significant range on 
the paranoia clinical scale, and only 32.1% (n = 26) scored in the clinically significant range on 
the schizophrenia clinical scale. Out of the 277 mental health experts instructed to simulate 
paranoid schizophrenia, 96.8% (n = 268) scored in the clinically significant range on the 
paranoia clinical scale, and 88.4% (n = 245) scored in the clinically significant range on the 




 Hypothesis #1 expected that, using their expertise in the field, the mental health experts 
group would be able to successfully feign paranoid schizophrenia on the PAI, such that they 
would not have overall elevated scores on the NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index, but they 
would have at least one elevated score on one of the eleven PAI clinical scales. This hypothesis 
was partially supported.  
 Overall, the mental health experts group was not able to successfully feign paranoid 
schizophrenia on the PAI, as the majority of the experts were above the cutoff scores for at least 
one of the three malingering indicator variables. Only nine participants (3.2%) in the mental 
health experts group were identified as responding honestly on all three variables. The majority 
were classified as feigning on one measure (n = 207; 74.7%), while 50 participants (18.1%) were 
identified as feigning on two measures, and ten participants (3.6%) were identified as feigning on 
all three measures. Table 2 provides a summary of the participants in the mental health experts 
group that were identified as feigning, as well as their average significant elevations on the 
eleven PAI clinical scales.  
 The eleven PAI clinical scales were then examined in further depth across this group. The 
average number of significant elevations (T ≥ 70) on the eleven PAI clinical scales across the 
mental health experts group was 4.8 clinically significant elevations (M = 4.79, SD = 2.89, range 
= 0 to 11). However, of the 277 mental health experts, a total of six mental health experts had 
zero significant elevations (T ≥ 70) on any of the eleven PAI clinical scales. Of these six mental 
health experts, three participants (50%) were identified as responding honestly on all three 
malingering variables, two participants (33.3%) were identified as feigning on one measure, and 
datum for one participant (16.7%) was missing, likely due to an incomplete response set on the 
PAI. Because these six mental health experts had no significant elevations (T ≥ 70) on any of the 
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eleven PAI clinical scales and were therefore unlikely to have followed the instructions to feign 
symptoms on the PAI, they were excluded from all further analyses. 
For two of the three malingering indicators, the mean value earned by the mental health 
experts group was below the recommended cutoff score, demonstrating that many participants 
scored in the range suggesting a genuine response style. For the NIM scale, the average value 
was approximately 76 (M = 75.93; SD = 18.29; n = 271). The recommended cutoff score is T ≥ 
92, demonstrating that many participants scored below the cutoff score, but within the range of 
possible symptom exaggeration. Specifically, 79.3% (n = 215) of the mental health experts were 
classified as genuine responders on the NIM scale. Similarly, for the MAL index, the average 
value was approximately 77 (M = 76.99; SD = 17.29; n = 271). The recommended cutoff score is 
T ≥ 111, demonstrating that many participants scored below the cutoff score. Specifically, 93.7% 
(n = 254) of the mental health experts were classified as genuine responders on the MAL index. 
On the other hand, for the RDF index, the average value was approximately 80 (M = 80.21; SD = 
12.65; n = 271). The recommended cutoff score is T ≥ 59, demonstrating that many participants 
scored above the cutoff score. Specifically, only 3.3% (n = 9) of the mental health experts were 
classified as genuine responders on the RDF index.  
Pearson’s R correlations revealed that within the mental health experts, NIM scale scores 
were significantly positively correlated with MAL index scores, r(269) = . 534, p < .001. 
Similarly, NIM scale scores were significantly positively correlated with RDF index scores, 
r(269) = .129, p = .034. Finally, MAL index scores and RDF index scores were also significantly 




 Hypothesis #2 expected that the genuine psychiatric patients group would not be 
identified as feigning psychiatric symptoms on the PAI, such that they would not have overall 
elevated scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index. This hypothesis was partially 
supported.  
 Overall, the psychiatric inpatients group presented with genuine psychiatric symptoms in 
general on the PAI, as the majority of the patients were below the cutoff scores on at least two of 
the three malingering indicator variables. The majority of the genuine psychiatric inpatients 
group was classified as feigning on either zero (n = 35; 43.2%) or one (n = 35; 43.2%) measure, 
while five participants (6.2%) were identified as feigning on two measures, and one participant 
(1.2%) was identified as feigning on all three measures. Table 2 provides a summary of the 
participants in the psychiatric inpatients group that were identified as feigning, as well as their 
average significant elevations on the eleven PAI clinical scales. 
For all three malingering indicators, the mean value earned by the psychiatric inpatients 
group was below the recommended cutoff score, demonstrating that many participants scored in 
the range suggesting a genuine response style. For the NIM scale, the average value was 
approximately 66 (M = 66.10; SD = 20.68; n = 81). The recommended cutoff score is T ≥ 92, 
demonstrating that many participants scored below the cutoff score. Specifically, 86.4% (n = 70) 
of the psychiatric inpatients were classified as genuine responders on the NIM scale. Similarly, 
for the MAL index, the average value was approximately 64 (M = 64.20; SD = 16.32; n = 80). 
The recommended cutoff score is T ≥ 111, demonstrating that many participants scored below 
the cutoff score. Specifically, 98.8% (n = 80) of the psychiatric inpatients were classified as 
genuine responders on the MAL index. Finally, for the RDF index, the average value was 
slightly less than 59 (M = 58.67; SD = 10.43; n = 76). The recommended cutoff score is T ≥ 59, 
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demonstrating that several participants scored conservatively below the cutoff score. 
Specifically, 55.6% (n = 45) of the psychiatric inpatients were classified as genuine responders 
on the RDF index. 
Pearson’s R correlations revealed that within the psychiatric inpatients, NIM scale scores 
were significantly positively correlated with MAL index scores, r(78) = . 613, p < .001. 
However, NIM scale scores were not significantly correlated with RDF index scores, r(74) = 
.055, p = . 635. Finally, MAL index scores and RDF index scores were also not significantly 
correlated among the psychiatric inpatients, r(74) = .050, p = . 666. 
 However, not all psychiatric inpatients presented with clinically significant levels of 
psychiatric symptoms. The average number of significant elevations (T ≥ 70) on the eleven PAI 
clinical scales across this group was 2.8 clinically significant elevations (M = 2.78, SD = 3.12, 
range = 0 to 11). A total of 20 (24.7%) of the psychiatric inpatients did not present with any 
significant elevations on any of the eleven PAI clinical scales. This may indicate positive 
impression management, or an underreporting of psychiatric symptoms. To further explore if 
these 20 psychiatric inpatients were underreporting psychiatric symptoms at the time of their PAI 
administration, their overall score on the positive impression management scale was examined. 
These 20 patients earned a mean value of approximately 61 on the Positive Impression 
Management (PIM) scale (M = 61.40; SD = 6.099; n = 20). This demonstrates that many of these 
patients scored in the range suggesting a cautious but genuine response style. Another possible 
explanation is that, because the PAI was administered to this group at any point during their 
psychiatric hospitalization, these PAI responses may also indicate successful psychiatric 
treatment and a reduction of symptoms reaching the level of clinical significance.  
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Interestingly, out of the 81 psychiatric inpatients diagnosed with genuine paranoid 
schizophrenia, only 48.1% (n = 39) scored in the clinically significant range on the paranoia 
clinical scale, and only 32.1% (n = 26) scored in the clinically significant range on the 
schizophrenia clinical scale. This indicates that while the majority of the psychiatric inpatients 
presented with genuine psychiatric symptoms on the PAI, they were not necessarily symptoms 
consistent with a paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis.  
Hypothesis #3 
 Because the mental health experts were expected to successfully feign paranoid 
schizophrenia on the PAI, Hypothesis #3 expected that the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and 
RDF index would not demonstrate significant predictive power or high classification accuracy 
between groups. This hypothesis was partially supported.  
First, the classification rates for the NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index were 
calculated according to the recommended cutoff scores (NIM ≥ 92, MAL ≥ 111, and RDF ≥ 59). 
The percentage of participants classified as feigning in each group is presented in Table 3. The 
overall classification accuracy for the NIM scale was 35.54%, 86.72% for the RDF index, and 
27.19% for the MAL index. This data, as well as the sensitivity and specificity rates for each 
malingering indicator, are also presented in Table 3. In general, the mental health experts group 
scored higher than the psychiatric inpatients group on all three indicators of feigning. Overall, 
the RDF index yielded the highest percentage of feigned responses across both groups. The 
MAL index produced the lowest percentage of feigned responses across both groups.   
After the classification rates for the NIM scale, RDF index, and MAL index were 
calculated, as well as the count of scales/indexes above the cutoff scores, these four categorical 
variables were analyzed using a chi-square test of independence to determine if each malingering 
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indicator successfully differentiated between groups. Because the assumption of an expected 
frequency of < 5 was violated for the MAL index, Fisher’s Exact Test was utilized instead. For 
the NIM scale, there was no significant relationship between the group and NIM scale cutoff 
scores, χ2(1) = 2.031, p = .154, Cramer’s V = .076. Similarly, for the MAL index, there was no 
significant relationship between the group and MAL index cutoff scores, χ2(1) = 3.203, p = .086, 
Cramer’s V = .096. This suggests that there was no association between NIM or MAL cutoff 
scores and group, meaning both NIM and MAL cutoff scores did not successfully differentiate 
between the psychiatric inpatients and mental health experts. On the other hand, for the RDF 
index, there was a significant relationship between the group and RDF index cutoff scores, χ2(1) 
= 119.009, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .586. This suggests that there was a significant association 
between RDF cutoff scores and group, meaning RDF cutoff scores successfully differentiated 
between the psychiatric inpatients and mental health experts. Finally, for the count of 
scales/indexes above the cutoff scores, there was a significant relationship between the group and 
count, χ2(3) = 110.389, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .564. This suggests that the count of 
scales/indexes above the cutoff scores variable successfully differentiated between the 
psychiatric inpatients and mental health experts.    
Finally, to assess the classification accuracy of the NIM scale, RDF index, and MAL 
index, three Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve analyses were conducted. The NIM 
scale and MAL index significantly differentiated genuine psychiatric inpatients from simulating 
mental health experts with a moderate level of classification accuracy, generating AUC values 
less than .80. The NIM scale significantly generated moderate classification accuracy, AUC = 
.656, 95% CI [.578, .733], p < .001, as did the MAL index, AUC = .703, 95% CI [.637, .769], p 
< .001. However, the RDF index significantly generated a high level of classification accuracy, 
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AUC = .913, 95% CI [.880, .945], p < .001. This indicates that, while all three malingering 
indicators significantly differentiated genuine psychiatric inpatients from simulating mental 
health experts, the RDF index did so with high classification accuracy (AUC = .913), while the 
NIM scale (AUC = .656) and MAL index (AUC = .703) did so with only moderate classification 
accuracy. The ROC curve is presented in Figure 1.  
Hypothesis #4 
Hypothesis #4 expected that there would be no significant differences on the PAI NIM 
scale, MAL index, or RDF index between the mental health experts group and genuine 
psychiatric patients group, signifying that the expertise within the mental health experts group 
impacted their ability to successfully feign paranoid schizophrenia. This hypothesis was not 
supported.  
 To examine this hypothesis, three one-way ANOVAs were performed with the group as 
the between-subjects factor, and the PAI NIM scale, PAI RDF index, and PAI MAL index as the 
respective indicators of feigning. Both groups were examined for violations of normality and 
variance. Neither of the groups violated skewness or kurtosis, and therefore did not violate 
assumptions of normality. Homogeneity of variance was not violated for any of the analyses. The 
type of group had a statistically significant effect on PAI NIM scale scores, F(1, 350) = 16.948, p 
< .001, η2 = 0.046; PAI RDF index scores, F(1, 345) = 184.827, p < .001, η2 = 0.349; and PAI 
MAL index scores, F(1, 349) = 34.631, p < .001, η2 = 0.090. Results from the PAI NIM scale 
score revealed that the mental health experts group scored higher on the PAI NIM scale than the 
psychiatric inpatients group (Mdiff = 9.83, d = 0.52). Similarly, results from the PAI RDF index 
score revealed that the mental health experts group scored higher on the PAI RDF index than the 
psychiatric inpatients group (Mdiff = 21.54, d = 1.77). Finally, results from the PAI MAL index 
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score revealed that the mental health experts group scored higher on the PAI MAL index than the 
psychiatric inpatients group (Mdiff = 12.79, d = 0.75). Because the mental health experts group 
scored significantly higher on all three malingering indicators when compared to the psychiatric 
inpatients, they did not successfully feign paranoid schizophrenia on the PAI. 
Hypothesis #5 
Hypothesis #5 expected that when the MAL index cutoff score, RDF index cutoff score, 
and NIM scale cutoff score were used together, this would improve classification accuracy above 
the NIM scale cutoff score alone. This hypothesis was partially supported.  
To investigate Hypothesis #5, two binary hierarchical logistic regressions were conducted 
across both groups to determine the utility of the RDF index and MAL index beyond the 
classification accuracy of the NIM scale. In the first binary hierarchical logistic regression, the 
cutoff scores for each variable were utilized as the independent variables (NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 
111; RDF ≥ 59), with the scores below the cutoff serving as the reference group. The type of 
group (psychiatric inpatients or mental health experts) was entered as the dependent variable. For 
the independent variables, the NIM scale variable was entered into the model as a first step, and 
then the MAL index and RDF index were entered as a second step in the model. The first step of 
the model did not demonstrate an overall good fit, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .007. The NIM scale cutoff 
score was not an improvement over the default model, 𝜒2(1) = 1.538, p = .215. As such, the NIM 
scale cutoff score was not a significant predictor of type of group (b = 0.431, Wald = 1.444, p = 
.230, OR = 1.539, 95% CI [0.762, 3.110]). Classification accuracy did not improve from the base 
step (78.1%) to the model with the NIM scale cutoff score entered as a predictor (78.1%). 
However, the second step of the model demonstrated an overall good fit, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .390. 
The RDF index cutoff score and MAL index cutoff score were an improvement over the first 
52 
 
step of the model, 𝜒2(2) = 99.869, p < .001. The odds of being placed into the mental health 
experts group were 32.321 times higher for those who scored above the RDF index cutoff score 
when compared to those who were below the cutoff score, b = 3.476, Wald = 70.528, p < .001, 
OR = 32.321, 95% CI [14.362, 72.740]. However, the MAL index cutoff score was not a 
significant predictor of type of group (b = 1.366, Wald = 1.317, p = .251, OR = 3.920, 95% CI 
[0.380, 40.404]). Overall classification accuracy improved from the first step of the model 
(78.1%) to the second step of the model with the RDF index and MAL index cutoff scores 
entered as predictors (87.3%). 
In the second binary hierarchical logistic regression, each malingering variable (NIM 
scale, MAL index, and RDF index) was entered using its continuous T-score, and the type of 
group (psychiatric inpatients or mental health experts) was entered as the dependent variable. 
Once again, the NIM scale variable was entered into the model as a first step, and then the MAL 
index and RDF index were entered as a second step in the model. The first step of the model 
demonstrated an overall good fit, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .062. The NIM scale was an improvement 
over the default model, 𝜒2(1) = 14.227, p < .001. For every one T-score point increase, the odds 
of being placed into the mental health experts group were multiplied by 1.028, b = .028, Wald = 
12.661, p < .001, OR = 1.028, 95% CI [1.013, 1.044]. However, classification accuracy did not 
improve from the base step (78.1%) to the model with the NIM scale entered as a predictor 
(78.1%). Once again, the second step of the model demonstrated an overall good fit, 
Nagelkerke’s R2 = .537. The RDF index and MAL index were an improvement over the first step 
of the model, 𝜒2(2) = 134.736, p < .001. For every one T-score point increase in the RDF index, 
the odds of being placed into the mental health experts group were multiplied by 1.145, b = .135, 
Wald = 64.531, p < .001, OR = 1.145, 95% CI [1.108, 1.183]. Similarly, for every one T-score 
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point increase in the MAL index, the odds of being placed into the mental health experts group 
were multiplied by 1.029, b = .029, Wald = 5.568, p = .018, OR = 1.029, 95% CI [1.005, 1.054]. 
Overall classification accuracy improved from the first step of the model (78.1%) to the second 
step of the model with the RDF index and MAL index entered as predictors (87.6%). 
Examining Mental Health Experts 
To address the remaining hypotheses, differences only within the mental health experts 
group were examined. Prior to investigating Hypotheses #6 and #7, additional descriptive 
characteristics about this group were calculated. The type of expertise (psychology or psychiatry) 
was calculated, as well as the length of expertise (less than doctoral degree or doctoral degree 
and beyond) among the mental health experts group (see Table 4). In general, the majority of the 
mental health experts had less than a doctoral degree (n = 236; 87.1%). Also, the majority of this 
group had expertise in the discipline of psychology (n = 189; 69.7%). Then, descriptive statistics 
were calculated again based on type and length of expertise for the mental health experts group 
only. Table 5 examines the PAI NIM scale, PAI RDF index, and PAI MAL index scores among 
the mental health experts group by education level, and Table 6 presents the same indicators of 
feigning among the mental health experts group by discipline. In general, the indicators of 
feigning were similar across education levels. They were also very similar across discipline. 
These descriptive characteristics were utilized to examine differences within the mental health 
experts group in the remaining hypotheses.  
Hypothesis #6 
 Hypothesis #6 expected that, within the mental health experts group, those with doctoral 
degrees or beyond would be significantly less likely to be detected as feigning on the PAI, such 
that they would have significantly lower PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index scores, 
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when compared with those with less than doctoral degrees in the mental health field. Table 5 
presents the PAI NIM scale, PAI RDF index, and PAI MAL index scores among the mental 
health experts group by education level. This hypothesis was not supported.   
To examine this hypothesis, three one-way ANOVAs were performed with mental health 
experts’ education levels as the between-subjects factor, and the PAI NIM scale, PAI RDF index, 
and PAI MAL index as the respective indicators of feigning. Both groups were examined for 
violations of normality and variance. Neither of the groups violated skewness or kurtosis, and 
therefore did not violate assumptions of normality. Homogeneity of variance was not violated for 
any of the analyses. The mental health experts’ education levels did not have a statistically 
significant effect on PAI NIM scale scores, F(1, 269) = 0.684, p = 0.409, η2 = 0.003; PAI RDF 
index scores, F(1, 269) = 0.331, p = 0.566, η2 = 0.001; or PAI MAL index scores, F(1, 269) = 
0.291, p = .590, η2 = 0.001. Results from the PAI NIM scale score revealed that the mental health 
experts with less than a doctoral degree scored higher on the PAI NIM scale than those with a 
doctoral degree or beyond (Mdiff = 2.74, d = 0.15). Similarly, results from the PAI RDF index 
score revealed that the mental health experts with less than a doctoral degree scored higher on 
the PAI RDF index than those with a doctoral degree or beyond (Mdiff = 1.32, d = 0.10). 
However, results from the PAI MAL index score revealed that the mental health experts with a 
doctoral degree or beyond scored higher on the PAI MAL index than those with less than a 
doctoral degree (Mdiff = 1.69, d = 0.10). These analyses indicate that there were no significant 





 Hypothesis #7 expected that, within the mental health experts group, those in the 
psychiatric field would be significantly more likely to be detected as feigning on the PAI, such 
that they would have significantly higher scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF 
index, when compared with those in the psychological field. Table 6 presents the PAI NIM scale, 
PAI RDF index, and PAI MAL index scores among the mental health experts group by 
discipline. Once again, this hypothesis was not supported.  
To examine this hypothesis, once again, three one-way ANOVAs were performed with 
mental health experts’ fields of discipline as the between-subjects factor, and the PAI NIM scale, 
PAI RDF index, and PAI MAL index as the respective indicators of feigning. Both groups were 
examined for violations of normality and variance. Neither of the groups violated skewness or 
kurtosis, and therefore did not violate assumptions of normality. Homogeneity of variance was 
not violated for any of the analyses. The mental health experts’ fields of discipline did not have a 
statistically significant effect on PAI NIM scale scores, F(1, 264) = 0.087, p = 0.768, η2 < 0.001; 
PAI RDF index scores, F(1, 264) = 1.519, p = 0.219, η2 = 0.006; or PAI MAL index scores, F(1, 
264) = 2.084, p = 0.150, η2 = 0.008. Results from the PAI NIM scale score revealed that the 
mental health experts in the discipline of psychology scored higher on the PAI NIM scale than 
those in the discipline of psychiatry (Mdiff = 0.73, d = 0.04). Similarly, results from the PAI RDF 
index score revealed that the mental health experts in the discipline of psychology scored higher 
on the PAI RDF index than those in the discipline of psychiatry (Mdiff = 2.09, d = 0.17). On the 
other hand, results from the PAI MAL index score revealed that the mental health experts in the 
discipline of psychiatry scored higher on the PAI MAL index than those in the discipline of 
psychology (Mdiff = 3.38, d = 0.20). These analyses indicate that there were no significant 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
This study added to the body of literature examining mental health experts as simulators, 
and it was also one of the first to examine the impact of professional differences within the 
expert sample. This study concluded that mental health experts are not necessarily more 
successful at feigning psychiatric symptoms than other more commonly utilized populations in 
simulation designs. Interestingly, because a large sample of mental health experts were utilized 
in this study, differences within this group were able to be examined. This study split the mental 
health experts group up by both the type of their expertise (psychology or psychiatry), as well as 
the length of their expertise (less than doctoral degree or doctoral degree and beyond). It was 
found that there were no significant differences when examining either of the differences within 
the mental health experts group. Taken together, based on the results of this study, mental health 
experts may not necessarily serve as more “sophisticated” simulators in these research designs, 
despite their expertise in the relevant disciplines. None of the malingering scales indicated both 
high rates of sensitivity and specificity. These findings are consistent with previous research 
examining differences within mental health disciplines (e.g., Bagby et al., 1997a). This further 
supports the notion that “expertise” in a particular discipline is a multidimensional construct. 
Those with expertise in psychiatry compared to psychology undergo different training and 
clinical opportunities, which may clearly impact the manifestation of their expertise.    
 When examining the groups utilized in this study more closely, the differences between 
their psychiatric presentations is more evident. For example, the majority of the mental health 
experts were “caught” as feigners by at least one of the PAI malingering indicators used in this 
study. In fact, only a very small portion (2.2%) of mental health experts were identified as 
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genuine responders on all three malingering indicators. However, mental health experts’ scores 
on the three malingering indicators demonstrated more mixed findings. First, consistent with 
previous research findings (e.g., Morey & Lanier, 1998; Rios & Morey, 2013), of the three 
malingering indicators included in the present study, the RDF index demonstrated the largest 
effect sizes distinguishing genuine psychiatric inpatients from simulating mental health experts. 
A total of 262 (96.7%) of mental health experts scored above the recommended cutoff for the 
RDF index and were correctly detected as simulators in the present study. The RDF index was 
initially created because it best differentiated groups of individuals feigning emotional conditions 
from genuine clinical patients (Rogers et al., 1996), and it continues to demonstrate robustness in 
its detection of feigned symptoms. In the present study, the RDF index demonstrated an overall 
classification accuracy of approximately 87%, with very strong sensitivity. The findings from the 
present study provide further support for the existing literature (e.g., Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009; 
Morey, 2012) describing the utility of the RDF index in identifying feigned psychiatric 
symptoms. This scale might be less impacted by the noise related to general distress. However, 
the same empirical literature that supports the use of this scale in the identification of those 
feigning symptoms gives rise to a related concern regarding the high rate of false positive 
identifications in this study. Almost half (~44%) of genuine participants were identified as 
feigning using this scale.   
Again, consistent with prior research literature (e.g., Rios & Morey, 2013), the NIM scale 
and MAL index indicators demonstrated more mixed findings. Both of these indicators 
demonstrated a moderate effect size in distinguishing genuine psychiatric inpatients from 
simulating mental health experts. The NIM scale successfully differentiated the two groups, and 
the mean NIM scale score demonstrated that many mental health experts presented a psychiatric 
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presentation consisting of possible symptom exaggeration. However, the NIM scale displayed 
poor sensitivity (~21%), resulting in an overall classification accuracy of approximately 36%. 
The MAL index indicator also distinguished the two groups, but with moderate classification 
accuracy. Similar to the NIM scale, the MAL index demonstrated poor sensitivity (~6%) but 
strong specificity (~99%). To further illustrate this point, the majority of the simulating mental 
health experts (~94%) were identified as honest responders using the MAL index cutoff score. 
The MAL index was created to detect feigned severe psychopathology (Rios & Morey, 2013), so 
these findings demonstrate that the majority of mental health experts did not simulate psychiatric 
symptoms above this severity threshold on their PAI administration. Taken together, these 
findings provide further support that the NIM scale and MAL index may capture more 
exaggerated symptomatology, but the RDF index adequately captures truly feigned 
symptomatology. The findings from the present study therefore demonstrate the utility of the 
RDF index in the identification of simulators within this population. However, given the high 
rate of false positives, the RDF index might be better used as a screening measure of feigning, 
particularly in cases related to severe symptomatology.    
 In general, the psychiatric inpatients’ scores on the malingering indicators were 
substantially lower than those of the mental health experts, and the mean values for all three 
malingering indicators were below the corresponding recommended cutoff scores. Overall, the 
number of malingering indicators that each participant was above the cutoff score for 
significantly differentiated between the two groups in this study. But, when evaluating for 
feigning in clinical settings, evaluators may not use multiple scales to reach a determination 
about feigning, and even if they do, there is still the possibility for a high rate of false positives. 
For example, in the present study, approximately 43% of genuine psychiatric inpatients were 
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classified as feigning on one measure, about 6% were identified as feigning on two measures, 
and about 1% was identified as feigning on all three measures. A total of 11 (13.6%) genuine 
psychiatric inpatients were identified as feigning on the NIM scale, a total of 36 (44.4%) on the 
RDF index, and a total of 1 (1.2%) on the MAL index. These percentages indicate that patients 
who present with genuine mental illnesses in clinical settings are at risk of being inaccurately 
labeled as having a feigned response style or exaggerating their psychiatric presentations. 
Further, the psychiatric inpatients in this study had more varied clinical presentations, as 
evidenced by their lower proportion of participants above the clinical significance cutoff score 
on both the schizophrenia (~68%) and paranoia (~52%) subscales. These findings indicate that 
clinicians may overpathologize patients presenting with genuine psychiatric symptoms, 
particularly if their symptoms do not align with their reported psychiatric presentations. These 
results provide support for a multimethod approach in the assessment of malingering.  
It is also important to note that participant motivation plays an important role in 
simulation designs. This was evident when examining the eleven PAI clinical scales across both 
groups. The average number of significant elevations on these scales in the psychiatric inpatients 
group was approximately three, compared to about five for the mental health experts. 
Participants in the psychiatric inpatients group were hospitalized at the time of their PAI 
administration, and they may have been motivated to present themselves in a positive or 
favorable manner in order to achieve discharge from the inpatient setting. This is particularly 
relevant in the cases of involuntary psychiatric hospitalizations. For example, despite their 
psychiatric diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, approximately 25% of participants in this group 
endorsed no clinically significant symptoms on the PAI. When this subgroup was examined 
more closely, it is possible that they responded cautiously on the PAI, but still trended towards a 
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genuine response style. Another possible explanation is that, because the PAI was administered 
to this group at any point during their psychiatric hospitalization, these PAI responses may also 
indicate successful psychiatric treatment and a reduction of symptoms reaching the level of 
clinical significance. Therefore, this lower response rate of clinically significant elevations could 
be explained by a combination of possible underreporting in conjunction with psychiatric 
stabilization.  
On the other hand, the average number of significant elevations on the clinical scales in 
the mental health group was about five, approximately two scale elevations higher than the 
psychiatric inpatients group. One possibility for this is that the mental health experts may have 
been motivated to learn about the relevant clinical symptoms, but not necessarily motivated to 
feign only those specific symptoms. Mental health experts were instructed to simulate symptoms 
of paranoid schizophrenia specifically, but their overall motivation may have led to their higher 
number of endorsed clinically significant symptoms. Especially due to their expertise in the 
mental health field, they may have been intrinsically motivated to demonstrate their skill or 
expertise in the field, resulting in an endorsement of more symptoms, and possibly more specific 
symptoms. For example, if mental health experts listed and endorsed each criterion for 
schizophrenia during their PAI administration, this may have inadvertently elevated comorbid 
anxiety and/or depression scores, resulting in more clinically significant clinical scales overall. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the mental health experts did not demonstrate an understanding 
of the specific symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia, resulting in the endorsement of more 
clinical scales overall. However, it is possible for individuals to receive a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia without endorsing every criterion related to the mental illness. These differing 
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motivations between the psychiatric inpatients and mental health experts could have impacted 
the findings on the three malingering indicators in general.  
Another interesting finding to note was the differences in clinical significance on the PAI 
paranoia and schizophrenia clinical scales. All of the psychiatric inpatients included in this study 
were either diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia or given a rule-out diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia at the time of discharge. Despite this inclusion criteria, the majority of the 
psychiatric inpatients did not earn a clinically significant scale score on the paranoia clinical 
scale (~52%) or the schizophrenia clinical scale (~68%). On the other hand, the overwhelming 
majority of the mental health experts earned a clinically significant scale score on the paranoia 
clinical scale (~99%) and schizophrenia clinical scale (~90%). Once again, the differing 
motivations of the groups utilized in this study must be considered when interpreting these 
findings.  
This study featured a widely used psychological measure, the Personality Assessment 
Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007). Existing research has found that the PAI has several validity 
indicators are sensitive to both coached and uncoached feigning. For uncoached feigning, the 
effect sizes are even larger when identifying feigning of severe mental illnesses rather than 
anxiety or mood disorders, and when comparing feigners to clinical patients rather than honest 
respondents (Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009). This study instructed mental health experts to simulate 
a severe mental illness, paranoid schizophrenia, which advances this body of literature. 
Consistent with previous findings, the NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index variables were all 
significantly different between these two groups. The mental health experts group scored 
significantly higher than the psychiatric inpatients on all three of these malingering indicators, 
despite their mental health expertise, and despite being compared to clinical patients diagnosed 
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with a severe mental illness. These findings provide further support for the utility of these 
validity indicators on the PAI using mental health experts as simulators. However, these findings 
must also be weighed against the high risk for false positives that was demonstrated in the 
present study. The results provide evidence that genuine psychiatric inpatients presenting with 
true mental illnesses in clinical settings may be at risk of being overpathologized or inaccurately 
labeled as a feigner. This is particularly concerning in light of the juxtaposition between high 
rates of false positives on malingering scales and low rates of elevated scores on clinical scales. 
Therefore, although the PAI demonstrated utility in distinguishing simulating mental health 
experts as such, several genuine psychiatric inpatients were also incorrectly detected as feigning. 
If the PAI is utilized in these contexts, a multimethod approach in the assessment of malingering 
is strongly indicated.  
Existing research has described several indicators of feigning that can be observed by 
evaluators throughout the assessment process. For example, individuals attempting to feign may 
reiterate the prevalence of these symptoms several times throughout the clinical interview in an 
attempt to remind the evaluator of their severity. However, due to fatigue, these individuals may 
stop endorsing such symptoms as well (Conroy & Kwartner, 2006; Rogers, 1997; Rogers & 
Bender, 2003). But, based on the results of the present study, distinguishing genuine from 
feigned psychiatric presentations is not a simple or clear-cut task for evaluators. Even with the 
utility of the PAI in the present study, there was an overwhelming risk for false positives. 
Therefore, it is worthy to consider whether these potential indicators of feigning may also be 
described by the individual’s desire for help, the cyclical nature of their psychiatric symptoms, or 
general ambivalence about trusting an evaluator with such vulnerable and personal information. 
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Once again, these findings provide significant support for the need of a multimethod assessment 
of feigning.   
 Simulation designs are the most popular methodology to examine the ability of 
psychological testing to accurately distinguish genuine from feigned mental illness (Rogers & 
Gillard, 2011). Simulation studies have been published since the 1980s (Berry & Nelson, 2010), 
but the context of feigning has changed since that time. For example, in recent years, there has 
been a substantial amount of literature made available through the use of the internet. Now, with 
a simple internet search, individuals wishing to feign a particular disorder have easy access to 
information about relevant psychiatric symptoms. Even further, there is growing 
acknowledgment of mental illness in society more broadly. These factors may allow individuals 
wishing to feign to be more successful at such a task. Therefore, research using simulation 
designs must be mindful of the access to information that individuals instructed to feign 
symptoms have using modern technology. To mitigate these concerns, mental health experts may 
be particularly appealing to serve as simulators, as they have true knowledge of mental illnesses 
from direct clinical experience. Using mental health experts as simulators instead of the more 
commonly utilized undergraduate participants also allows researchers to examine whether those 
with direct clinical knowledge may feign more successfully than those with only academic 
knowledge from the classroom. Further, mental health experts may serve as a suitable proxy for 
individuals who attempt to feign psychiatric symptoms in real world contexts due to their 
intrinsic motivations. Although the motivation of mental health experts is exclusively related to 
their desire to learn about the disorder (rather than simulate the disorder in the study) due to their 
own professional goals, this could better mimic the motivations for external gain that serve as an 
impetus for individuals wishing to learn about psychiatric symptoms in order to feign.    
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This study was one of the first to examine differences within mental health experts 
serving as simulators. Mental health experts were split by both the type of their expertise 
(psychology or psychiatry), as well as the length of their expertise (less than doctoral degree or 
doctoral degree and beyond). Even when splitting the mental health experts up, there were still 
no significant differences by either type or length of expertise. Taken together, neither pre-
doctoral nor doctoral training in a mental health field indicated an ability to feign psychiatric 
symptoms more successfully, and the same was found for those with expertise in the 
psychological field compared to the psychiatric field. Overall, based on the findings in this study, 
mental health experts did not serve as more “sophisticated” simulators in this simulation research 
design, as their expertise learned through educational training did not predict more successful 
feigning of psychiatric symptoms. Mental health experts were detected by all three PAI 
malingering indicators, including the NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index. 
Limitations 
Despite the novel findings this study added to the extant literature, there are several 
limitations that must be considered when interpreting these findings. First, the data were 
previously collected and analyzed using an archival analysis. Therefore, any data that were 
missing were unable to be recovered. For example, age data were missing for all of the mental 
health experts, and racial data were missing for the majority (~66%) of the mental health experts 
as well. Therefore, this potentially limits the generalizability of these findings, as it is unknown if 
this sample of mental health experts is generalizable to the broader population. 
A further in-depth examination of the psychiatric inpatients group is warranted. First, 
psychiatric inpatients were included in the current study if they were diagnosed with or had a 
rule-out diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia at the time of their discharge. This limitation 
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resulted in the inclusion of approximately 75% of patients with the diagnosis, and approximately 
25% of patients with the rule-out diagnosis. Given that about 25% of the psychiatric patients 
only had a rule-out diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and may have had other diagnoses, this 
could have impacted their presentations on the feigning indicators. This limitation must be 
considered as the presentation of these psychiatric inpatients is compared to those of the mental 
health experts. Further, approximately 64% of the psychiatric inpatients were admitted to the 
hospital under forensic statuses. As discussed in the foundation for the current study, there is 
clear external motivation to feign or exaggerate psychiatric symptoms in such psycholegal 
contexts. As such, there is a higher than usual likelihood that some of these psychiatric patients 
would have been attempting to malinger psychiatric symptoms during their PAI administration. 
These characteristics of the psychiatric inpatients group must be considered during the 
interpretation of the findings in the current study.     
Another limitation to be considered includes the participants across both groups that did 
not present with any significant elevations on any of the eleven PAI clinical scales. A total of six 
mental health experts did not have any significant elevations on the clinical scales. Therefore, 
they were deemed as unlikely to have understood and/or followed the instructions to feign 
psychiatric symptoms on the PAI. As a result, they were excluded from all further analyses in the 
present study. On the other hand, there were also a total of 20 psychiatric inpatients that did not 
present with any significant elevations on the clinical scales, but they were still included in 
subsequent analyses. These decisions were made because it was assumed that the mental health 
experts who did not elevate any of the clinical scales either did not understand or did not follow 
the instructions to simulate paranoid schizophrenia. This assumption is a limitation which could 
have been assessed further with the inclusion of a post-test questionnaire in the present study. 
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However, a post-test questionnaire regarding the study’s feigning instructions was not included 
during the original data collection. The psychiatric inpatients who did not elevate clinical scales 
still had either a discharge diagnosis or rule-out discharge diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, 
so even though they did not elevate any clinical scales at the time of their PAI administration, it 
was assumed that they still experienced psychiatric symptoms during the course of their 
psychiatric hospitalization. These assumptions are clear limitations that must be considered 
during the interpretation of the research findings.  
Further, the psychiatric inpatients presented with a wider variety of psychiatric symptoms 
during their administration of the PAI. Even though all 81 psychiatric inpatients were diagnosed 
with genuine paranoid schizophrenia at the time of their discharge, only approximately 48% 
scored in the clinically significant range on the paranoia clinical scale, and only about 32% 
scored in the clinically significant range on the schizophrenia clinical scale. While the 
psychiatric inpatients presented with genuine psychiatric symptoms, they were not necessarily 
symptoms consistent with a paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis. This may have been impacted by 
the time in which they completed the PAI during the course of their psychiatric hospitalization, 
as it could have been offered to them at any time during their hospitalization. However, these 
findings imply that the psychiatric inpatients had a variety of psychiatric symptoms despite their 
diagnostic labels. These important clinical findings must be considered when interpreting the 
feigning results from the current study.    
Also, the way in which participant motivation in each group may have impacted the 
results in this study must be considered as a limitation. On average, the simulating mental health 
experts endorsed two more clinical scales above clinical significance when compared to the 
genuine psychiatric inpatients. Mental health experts may have been motivated to learn about the 
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relevant clinical symptoms, but not necessarily motivated to feign only those specific symptoms. 
The psychiatric inpatients were all hospitalized at the time of their PAI administration, and they 
may have been motivated to present themselves in a positive or favorable manner in order to 
achieve discharge. This may be particularly relevant for patients who were hospitalized 
involuntarily. On the other hand, the mental health experts may have been intrinsically motivated 
to demonstrate their skill or expertise in the field, or they may not have understood the specific 
symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia. Both of these factors could have resulted in the 
endorsement of more clinical scales overall for the mental health experts. Other simulation 
research studies have utilized a post-test questionnaire to ensure that simulating participants 
understood and followed the simulation instructions. However, as previously mentioned, a post-
test questionnaire was not utilized during the original data collection.    
Further, an additional limitation in this study is that the mental health experts did not 
complete a separate administration of the PAI in which they were instructed to respond honestly. 
Therefore, it is unknown how this group would have scored if they answered honestly, including 
whether they had any genuine symptoms of mental illness. As a result, their simulated PAI 
responses could not be compared to their simulated responses. The lack of a comparison with the 
mental health experts’ honest responses may have impacted their ability to successfully feign a 
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. 
Another limitation in this study to consider is the operationalization of mental health 
experts by level of education. Mental health experts were dichotomized into those with a 
doctoral degree or beyond and those with less than a doctoral degree. Experts placed in the “with 
a doctoral degree or beyond” group included psychologists, psychiatrists, residents, and fellows, 
and experts placed in the “less than a doctoral degree” group included medical students, 
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doctoral-level interns, doctoral-level externs, doctoral students, master’s students, and staff who 
provide monitoring services for the psychiatric inpatients. However, these academic milestones 
assume equivalent degrees of experience, which may not have held true for each expert. It is 
possible that some experts in the less than a doctoral degree group could have more relevant 
experience than some experts in the doctoral degree or beyond group. For example, doctoral-
level interns may have several more years of mental health experience than a resident. 
Nonetheless, information about years of experience was not available in the data set. Therefore, 
these possible idiosyncrasies must be considered when interpreting the findings from the present 
study. 
A final limitation in this study is the use of an outdated psychiatric diagnosis. The data 
were collected from January 12, 1998 until October 27, 2009, in which the current edition of the 
DSM was the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) or DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). In those editions of the DSM, 
the subcategory of “paranoid” schizophrenia was current. As a result, the group of mental health 
experts were specifically instructed to simulate paranoid schizophrenia during their PAI 
administrations. However, in 2013, the DSM-IV-TR was replaced with the DSM-5, and the 
subcategories of schizophrenia were eliminated (APA, 2013). Therefore, this subcategory of 
“paranoid” schizophrenia is no longer in the current DSM-5, but it was a current diagnosis when 
the data was collected.  
Future Directions 
 The results of this study suggested that mental health experts did not serve as more 
“sophisticated” feigners in this simulation research design. Despite their expertise, mental health 
experts were detected as simulators by all three PAI malingering indicators, including the NIM 
scale, MAL index, and RDF index. However, even though the mental health experts scored 
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significantly higher on all three of these malingering indicators and were significantly more 
likely to be detected as feigning on at least one of the indicators, mental health experts did not 
necessarily score above the recommended cutoff scores on all three of these variables. Further, 
this study demonstrated a high risk for false positives among genuine psychiatric inpatients. 
Almost half of the genuine psychiatric inpatients (~43%) were classified as feigning on one 
measure, about 6% were identified as feigning on two measures, and about 1% was identified as 
feigning on all three measures. Patients who present with genuine mental illnesses in clinical 
settings are at risk of being overpathologized or inaccurately labeled as having a feigned 
response style. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that both the NIM scale and MAL 
index had difficulty successfully differentiating between the simulating mental health experts 
and genuine psychiatric inpatients in this study. While the NIM scale scores suggested possible 
symptom exaggeration among mental health experts, their average score was not above the 
cutoff, limiting its classification accuracy. On the other hand, both the RDF index scores and 
count of scales/indexes above the cutoff scores significantly differentiated between these two 
groups. The RDF index generated excellent overall classification accuracy (~87%), 
demonstrating its utility above the NIM scale (~36%) and MAL index (~27%) in distinguishing 
between simulators and honest responders.  
 These findings demonstrate that the academic and clinical knowledge learned by mental 
health experts may not necessarily translate to accurate simulation of psychiatric symptoms. 
However, these findings also provide promise for the fear that individuals wishing to feign a 
particular disorder now have access to substantial relevant literature using modern technology 
and a simple internet search, which may lead them to feign more successfully. In this study, 
mental health experts, who had both academic and direct clinical knowledge, were still detected 
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as simulators using multiple malingering indicators on the PAI. The NIM scale, MAL index, and 
RDF index all successfully differentiated between the simulating mental health experts and 
genuine psychiatric inpatients, although the RDF index demonstrated superiority with excellent 
classification accuracy when compared to the remaining two indicators.  
 Future research is needed to build upon these findings and their generalizability. While 
this was one of the first studies to examine differences within mental health experts based on 
their type of discipline and level of education, some of their demographic data were unavailable, 
limiting the generalizability of these findings. Future research should gather comprehensive 
demographic data on all participants. Further, additional research should address the potential 
impact of motivation on findings of malingering. One method that could be utilized to mitigate 
this possibility is requiring that mental health experts complete a separate administration of the 
PAI in which they are instructed to respond honestly. This comparison would allow for stronger 
conclusions to be drawn regarding the impact of mental health experts’ honest responses on their 
feigned responses. Finally, future research should be conducted using the current psychiatric 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, rather than examining an outdated subcategory. Utilizing the 
diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5 would continue to build this body of literature on the use of 
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Descriptive Statistics by Group for PAI NIM Scale, RDF Index, and MAL Index 
 NIM Scale RDF Index MAL Index 
Group M SD n d M SD n d M SD n d 
Patients 66.10 20.68 81 
0.52 
58.67 10.43 76 
1.77 
64.20 16.32 80 
0.75 
Simulators 75.93 18.29 271 80.21 12.65 271 76.99 17.29 271 
Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; NIM = Negative Impression Management; RDF 





Count of Scales/Indexes above Cutoff Scores for Feigning 





Elevations n % 
Clinical Scale 
Elevations n % 
M SD M SD 
0 1.94 1.85 35 43.2 2.89 2.80 9 3.2 
1 2.80 3.25 35 43.2 4.09 2.49 207 74.7 
2 9.00 1.58 5 6.2 7.32 2.39 50 18.1 
3 10.00 N/A 1 1.2 8.09 2.02 10 3.6 
Note. The Negative Impression Management (NIM) scale, Malingering (MAL) index, and 
Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF) index were utilized in this count using the recommended 
cutoff scores (NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 111; RDF ≥ 59).  
Note. Data for five participants in the patients group and one participant in the simulators group 










Sensitivity Specificity PPAa NPAa 
Overall 
Classification 
Accuracy n % n % 
NIM 
Scale 
≥ 92  11 13.6 56 20.7 20.66% 86.42% 83.88% 24.15% 35.54% 
RDF 
Index 
≥ 59 36 44.4 262 96.7 96.68% 52.63% 87.47% 82.25% 86.72% 
MAL 
Index 
≥ 111 1 1.2 17 6.3 6.27% 98.75% 94.50% 23.55% 27.19% 
Note. NIM = Negative Impression Management; RDF = Rogers Discriminant Function; MAL = 
Malingering; PPA = Positive Predictive Accuracy; NPA = Negative Predictive Accuracy.  




Expertise among Simulators 
 N % 
Less Than Doctoral Degree 236 87.1 
Medical Students 47 17.3 
Doctoral-Level Interns 64 23.6 
Doctoral-Level Externs 69 25.5 
Doctoral Students 8 3.0 
Master’s Students 43 15.9 
Hospital Staff 5 1.8 
Doctoral Degree or Beyond 35 12.9 
Psychologists 5 1.8 
Psychiatrists  12 4.4 
Residents 8 3.0 
Fellows 10 3.7 
Psychology Discipline 189 71.1 
Doctoral-Level Interns 64 24.1 
Doctoral-Level Externs 69 25.9 
Doctoral Students 8 3.0 
Master’s Students 43 16.2 
Psychologists 5 1.9 
Psychiatry Discipline 77 28.9 
Medical Students 47 17.7 
Psychiatrists 12 4.5 
Residents 8 3.0 
Fellows 10 3.8 






Descriptive Statistics by Education Level for PAI NIM Scale, RDF Index, and MAL Index 
 NIM Scale RDF Index MAL Index 
Education 
Level 
M SD n d M SD n d M SD n d 
LTDD 76.28 18.41 236 
0.15 
80.38 12.71 236 
0.10 
76.77 17.62 236 
-0.10 
DDOB 73.54 17.47 35 79.06 12.37 35 78.46 15.06 35 
Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; NIM = Negative Impression Management; RDF 
= Rogers Discriminant Function; MAL = Malingering; LTDD = less than doctoral degree; 





Descriptive Statistics by Discipline for PAI NIM Scale, RDF Index, and MAL Index 
 NIM Scale RDF Index MAL Index 
Discipline M SD n d M SD n d M SD n d 
Psychology 76.20 18.41 189 
0.04 
80.77 12.47 189 
0.17 
76.13 17.04 189 
-0.20 
Psychiatry 75.47 18.29 77 78.68 12.86 77 79.51 17.99 77 
Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; NIM = Negative Impression Management; RDF 





Figure 1. ROC Curve for the NIM Scale, RDF Index, and MAL Index Comparing Genuine 
Psychiatric Inpatients and Simulating Mental Health Experts. 
